One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?

This paper studies how gradualism -- increasing required levels (“thresholds”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects individuals’ decisions to coordinate into a public project. We propose a theory based on belief updating to explore why gradualism may work, and test its predictions using a laboratory binary choice minimum-effort coordination game. We randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high threshold, starting at a low threshold but jumping to a high threshold after a few periods, and starting at a low threshold and gradually increasing the threshold over time (the “gradualism” treatment). We find that individuals coordinate most successfully at the high threshold in the gradualism treatment relative to the other two groups. We also discuss alternative explanations such as reinforcement learning, conditional cooperation, inertia, preference for consistency, and limited attention. Our findings point to a simple, voluntary mechanism to promote successful coordination when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited.