Don't Shoot the Messenger! Experimental Evidence on Delegation of Communication

In organizations and institutions, decision-makers frequently let a spokesperson communicate their decisions to those affected. How does the separation between making and communi- cating a choice affect fairness and reactions to harsh decisions? We conduct a lab experiment in which a decision-maker allocates a fair or unfair amount of money to herself, two receiv- ers, and a third party. The decision-maker or the third party, i.e. the spokesperson, communi- cates the allocation to the receivers, who then decide whether to punish or not. With aligned punishment, receivers must target the decision-maker and spokesperson with the same pun- ishment amount; with independent punishment they can decide whom to punish. Decision- makers choose more often the unfair allocation when punishment is aligned as opposed to in- dependent and are more likely to delegate communication than those chosing the fair alloca- tion in both cases. With independent punishment, receivers punish the decision-maker and the spokesperson more when the latter communicates the unfair allocation decision. That is be- cause, compared to decision-makers, spokespersons express more often “regret” than “need.” Receivers seem to perceive this as an attempt of shifting blame.