Performance Analysis: Work Control Events Identified January - August 2010

This performance analysis evaluated 24 events that occurred at LLNL from January through August 2010. The analysis identified areas of potential work control process and/or implementation weaknesses and several common underlying causes. Human performance improvement and safety culture factors were part of the causal analysis of each event and were analyzed. The collective significance of all events in 2010, as measured by the occurrence reporting significance category and by the proportion of events that have been reported to the DOE ORPS under the ''management concerns'' reporting criteria, does not appear to have increased in 2010. The frequency of reporting in each of the significance categories has not changed in 2010 compared to the previous four years. There is no change indicating a trend in the significance category and there has been no increase in the proportion of occurrences reported in the higher significance category. Also, the frequency of events, 42 events reported through August 2010, is not greater than in previous years and is below the average of 63 occurrences per year at LLNL since 2006. Over the previous four years, an average of 43% of the LLNL's reported occurrences have been reported as either ''management concerns'' or ''near misses.'' In 2010, 29% of the occurrences have been reported as ''management concerns'' or ''near misses.'' This rate indicates that LLNL is now reporting fewer ''management concern'' and ''near miss'' occurrences compared to the previous four years. From 2008 to the present, LLNL senior management has undertaken a series of initiatives to strengthen the work planning and control system with the primary objective to improve worker safety. In 2008, the LLNL Deputy Director established the Work Control Integrated Project Team to develop the core requirements and graded elements of an institutional work planning and control system. By the end of that year this system was documented and implementation had begun. In 2009, training of the workforce began and as of the time of this report more than 50% of authorized Integration Work Sheets (IWS) use the activity-based planning process. In 2010, LSO independently reviewed the work planning and control process and confirmed to the Laboratory that the Integrated Safety Management (ISM) System was implemented. LLNL conducted a cross-directorate management self-assessment of work planning and control and is developing actions to respond to the issues identified. Ongoing efforts to strengthen the work planning and control process and to improve the quality of LLNL work packages are in progress: completion of remaining actions in response to the 2009 DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) evaluation of LLNL's ISM System; scheduling more than 14 work planning and control self-assessments in FY11; continuing to align subcontractor work control with the Institutional work planning and control system; and continuing to maintain the electronic IWS application. The 24 events included in this analysis were caused by errors in the first four of the five ISMS functions. The most frequent cause was errors in analyzing the hazards (Function 2). The second most frequent cause was errors occurring when defining the work (Function 1), followed by errors during the performance of work (Function 4). Interestingly, very few errors in developing controls (Function 3) resulted in events. This leads one to conclude that if improvements are made to defining the scope of work and analyzing the potential hazards, LLNL may reduce the frequency or severity of events. Analysis of the 24 events resulted in the identification of ten common causes. Some events had multiple causes, resulting in the mention of 39 causes being identified for the 24 events. The most frequent cause was workers, supervisors, or experts believing they understood the work and the hazards but their understanding was incomplete. The second most frequent cause was unclear, incomplete or confusing documents directing the work. Together, these two causes were mentioned 17 times and contributed to 13 of the events. All of the events with the cause of ''workers, supervisors, or experts believing they understood the work and the hazards but their understanding was incomplete'' had this error in the first two ISMS functions: define the work and analyze the hazard. This means that these causes result in the scope of work being ill-defined or the hazard(s) improperly analyzed. Incomplete implementation of these functional steps leads to the hazards not being controlled. The causes are then manifested in events when the work is conducted. The process to operate safely relies on accurately defining the scope of work. This review has identified a number of examples of latent organizational weakness in the execution of work control processes.