Human Nature, Anthropology, and the Problem of Variation (Rough Draft)

In this essay, I begin with an overview of a traditional account of natural kinds, and then considerDavidHull's (1986) critiqueof species as natural kinds and the associated notion of human nature. Second, I explore recent "liberal" accounts of humannatureprovidedbyEdouardMachery (2008) andGrant Ramsey (2013) and criticized by Tim Lewens (2012). They attempt to avoid the criticisms offered by Hull. After examining those views, I turn to Richard Boyd's (1988; 1999) Homeostatic Property Cluster account of natural kinds which is flexible but detailed enough to avoid Hull's criticisms but also those affecting themore recent views. We then consider what I call the "problem of variation." Fourth, I consider two case studies -the basic emotions and facial expressions and inbreeding avoidance and incest taboos. I argue that the former is a component of a Boydian human nature but the latter is not. The conclusion is that if there is a human nature, it must be argued for on a case-by-case basis. And, one of most discussed cases thought to be part of our nature is simply not.