A Theory of Outsourced Fundraising: Why Dollars Turn into 'Pennies for Charity'
2017
Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed half of the solicited donations. To understand this practice, we propose a principal-agent model in which the charity optimally offers a higher commission to a more efficient solicitor, raising the price of giving significantly. Outsourcing is, therefore, profitable for the charity only if giving is very price-inelastic, which is not supported by empirical evidence. We show that outsourced fundraising can be optimal if: donors are unaware of this practice; the professional solicitor better activates donors’ warm-glow feelings toward the cause; or there is a significant fixed cost of fundraising. We argue that informing the public of the mere existence of paid solicitations may be the most effective policy available.
Keywords:
- Correction
- Source
- Cite
- Save
- Machine Reading By IdeaReader
80
References
2
Citations
NaN
KQI