Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games

Abstract We consider the evolution of fairness and coalition formation in a three-person ultimatum game in which the coalition value depends on its size. Traditional game theory, which assumes selfish and rational players, predicts the largest and efficient coalition with a proposer exploiting most of the total value. In a stochastic evolutionary model (the frequency-dependent Moran process with mutations) where players make errors in estimating the payoffs and strategies of others, evolutionary selection favors the formation of a two-person subcoalition under weak selection and in the low mutation limit if and only if its coalition value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest coalition. Proposers offer 30–35% of the subcoalition value to a coalition member, excluding a non-member. Multilateral bargaining is critically different from the bilateral one. Coalition-forming behavior may cause economic inefficiency and social exclusion. Stochastic evolutionary game theory thus provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person ultimatum game.