The Anti-Skepticism Of John Buridan And Thomas Aquinas: Putting Skeptics In Their Place Versus Stopping Them In Their Tracks

This chapter first identifies those common epistemological and methodological principles at work in John Buridan, Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and John Greco which these authors all rely on in their efforts to put skeptics in their place. Then, it elaborates on the issue of exactly how Buridan uses these principles in meeting contemporary skeptical challenges. The chapter also compares Buridans anti-skeptical strategy with what the author takes to be the earlier (mostly implicit) strategy, embedded, as it were, in a broader metaphysical framework that automatically stopped skeptics in their tracks. This comparison then enables us in the concluding section to draw some general conclusions concerning the relationships between epistemology and metaphysics (or rather semantics). Keywords: anti-skepticism; epistemology; G.E. Moore; John Buridan; John Greco; metaphysics; skeptical challenges; Thomas Aquinas; Thomas Reid