Continuities and Change in Early Emotional Life

During the past few decades, developmentalists have focused increasing attention on the substantial transformations which occur in early infancy (Emde, Gaensbauer, & Harmon, 1976; Kagan, Kearsley, & Zalazo, 1979; McCall, Eichorn, & Hogarty, 1977; Spitz, 1959). This orientation has prompted research concerning the emergence of various emotions in the developing infant. Bridges (1932) provided the foundation for this tradition by postulating the differentiation of more complex emotions out of simpler ones. For example, she suggested that by 4 months of age anger became differentiated out of a global distress which existed early in infancy. Recent versions of the differentiation hypothesis specify the emergence of discrete emotions as a function of the attainment of cognitive prerequisites (e.g., Sroufe, 1979). Sroufe, for example, views early rage as a precursor to anger, which he believes emerges in the latter half of the first year; only when the infant is capable of perceiving the cause of an interruption to his plan can the previously diffuse rage reaction become the focused emotion of anger.