The Copernican Shift and Theory of Knowledge in Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl.

In this thesis I explore the foundations of the respective theories of knowledge for both Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. Particularly I direct attention towards Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Husserl’s lectures given at the University of Gottingen entitled Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge; which were given between the release of his Logical Investigations and Ideas I. I wish to explicate the similar questions that the two philosophers addressed, and that both saw the answers to the issues of knowledge as being founded in the Copernican view of an analysis of subjectivity and the a priori. Kant’s Copernican revolution establishing grounds from which Husserl was able to enact his phenomenological investigation of the role of subjectivity. Yet, I also wish to explore the distinction within their methodologies of arriving at what constitutes a priori knowledge and the effect this difference of methodology causes in their respective epistemological theories, leading to the conclusion showing their different respective concepts regarding the accessibility of das ding an-sich, or the thing in-itself.