Modeling and Simulation of the Aurora Attack on Microgrid Point of Common Coupling

The smart grid paradigm promises dramatic improvements in reliability, resiliency and efficiency of power systems while addressing environmental concerns. Yet, the extensive reliance of these smart power systems on communication and information technologies increases the cyberattack surface opening up a new class of vulnerabilities to disturb power system operation. In this paper, we study the aurora attack class of assaults specifically against a microgrid point of common coupling (PCC). In contrast to the aurora attack on synchronous generator breakers, it is shown that the microgrid load level, storage and distributed generation characteristics play a key role in determining attack success. Moreover, a mitigation method based on distributed control is proposed and investigated. A co-simulation platform based on OPAL-RT real-time power system simulator and OPNET communication network simulator using the System-in-the-loop feature is employed to validate the analytical results and discussions.