NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games - eScholarship

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Department BERKELEY o f Economics Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a Working Paper 8736 NASH AND PERFECT EQUILIBRIA OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin A p r i l 2, 1987 Key words: Repeated g a i n s , folk theorem. Abstract The p e r f e c t F o l k Theorem f o r d i s c o u n t e d r e p e a t e d games e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e s e t s o f Nash and subgame-perfect e q u i l i b r i u m p a y o f f s a r e e q u a l i n t h e l i m i t as the d i s c o u n t f a c t o r - S . JEL Classification: