Tribal Affiliation and the Distribution of Power in Libya

The affiliation decisions of Libya's tribes strongly influence the distribution of political power; collective support by the tribes bolsters the legitimacy and political will of their chosen group. Using an agent-based model of hypothesized tribal affiliation dynamics, we demonstrate an affiliation heuristic based on the relative dominance of a given political leaning with respect to military capabilities, economic resources, and affinity--an abstract aggregation of ideology, tribal identity, and other attributes. Qualitatively validating our control results against observed distribution of power trends, we use our model to explore policy questions related to how changes in military and economic resources may lead to changes in tribal affiliation patterns, including what preconditions facilitate power shifts. Of the three major groups vying for power between 2014 and 2015, we find that the House of Representatives was the most resilient for retaining a majority of tribal support over wide ranges of change in military and economic control, the General National Congress was highly sensitive to control of military power, and extremist groups significantly depend on economic resource dominance to achieve majority tribal support. This research demonstrates a computational approach--based on sparse and largely qualitative data--to explore how conflict, international policy, and foreign aid might influence the balance of political power outcomes.