The role of auditor characteristics: earnings management and audit committee effectiveness

This study aims to analyze the moderating effect of auditor characteristics on the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and earnings management. Mechanisms of good corporate governance can limit and control the opportunistic actions of management. A highly effective audit committee will reduce the prevalence of earnings management. In addition to the audit committee as an internal party that oversees the credibility of financial statements, it is also necessary to supervise external parties, through the use of external auditors. With expectations of reducing earnings manipulation, this study examines the effects of the combination of an effective audit committee and an independent auditor. The research sample selection uses a purposive judgmental non-probability sampling technique. The sample obtained is 754 firm years, consisting of three years of company observations in the Indonesian capital market between 2016 and 2018, except those in the financial sector. Earnings management is measured by accrual value using a modified Jones model. The independent variable of the study is the effectiveness of the audit committee (EFAC) which will be assessed using the DeZoort index. The results of the empirical testing support the research hypothesis; the more effective the audit committee is and the longer the external audit period is, the more prevalent earnings management will be. In addition, the more effective the audit committee is, coupled with the use of one of the big four auditors, the less prevalent earnings management will be, which means the auditor's reputation also strengthens the relationship between the effectiveness of the audit committee and earnings management. Further, the moderating effect of auditor specialization on the influence of the audit committee on earnings manipulation did not provide significant results.