Assymetric socialization in inter-age transfers

Inter-age reallocations fl owing from the working age population to the elderly can be socialized to a larger extent than reallocations fl owing from the working age population to children. Children must be raised by their parents; the elderly can rely on society. We call this asymmetric socialization. By socialization we mean the arrangement of inter-age reallocations by institutions larger than kinship or local community. Intuitively, partners in a socialized arrangement do not know each other in person whereas in the case of non-socialized reallocations they do. A socialized reallocation is organized by government, non-profi t bodies or corporations. Examining the age patterns of economic activity and delineating inter-age transfers, we explore economic relations between generations (National Transfer Accounts, NTA). In addition we incorporate age profi les of unpaid household labor in the reallocation system by estimating time transfers (value of household labor carried out for someone else in the household) across ages (National Time Transfer Accounts, NTTA). We demonstrate asymmetric socialization in Figure 1 using Hungarian NTA and NTTA age-profi les. In panel A, we present the normalized per capita age profi le of net public transfers. Such transfers fl ow towards the elderly and mainly include public pensions and health care. Children receive public education and health care. Proportions favor the elderly.