Insight as an Epistemic Value of Film

Some Films are valued for their insight into the issues and situations they depict. This effect is typically expressed in the evaluations of documentaries, but it can also be found in the evaluations of fiction films, e.g. period pieces or psychological dramas. To say that something provides insight involves an epistemological claim: Insight into something excludes deception. Therefore, it is only possible to gain insight into something by watching a film if the film truthfully represents the relevant facts. From the viewer’s position, this is usually a matter of epistemic trust. But granted that a viewer trusts a film to represent the general facts accurately, it can still provide insight to a greater or lesser extent, and it is taken to be better or worse in that respect. Moreover, in many cases, the impression of insight cannot rely on the viewer’s previous familiarity with the subject. It must be achieved by a film’s form, i.e. by presenting its subject in a certain way. How can we conceptualize the insight gained by watching a film? A model to explain different varieties of insight in otherwise equally trusted depictions can be found along the lines of Wittgenstein’s writings on the way of doing philosophy: philosophy does not discover and state facts, but it sees the given facts in a different and illuminating way. In the context of film, Cavell describes this approach as turning “our epistemological convictions inside out: reality is known before its appearances are known.” My interpretation of these and other remarks will show (1) how the achievement of insight is a formal achievement of film that depends on, but is not identical to truthful representation; and (2) how film can be said to “do” philosophy by providing insight in a similar way.