Nuclear Energy and Terrorism

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have been voiced that one of the nation's 103 commercial nuclear power plants might be the next terrorist target. Immediately following the attack, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) ordered a heightened state of alert at all nuclear plants. Calls went out to augment nuclear plant security forces and some governors deployed National Guard troops at nuclear facilities. The U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation (H.R. 2983) that could drastically revise the Commission's security requirements for nuclear facilities. A proposed Senate bill (S. 1746) would federalize nuclear plant security forces. Additionally, there have been calls for installing anti-aircraft weapons at nuclear plants and creating permanent "no fly" zones around them. Some nuclear power opponents, claiming that nuclear plants are highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, have seized on the events of September 1 1 as their latest argument for shutting down the nation's nuclear industry. The public is understandably sensitive to nuclear plant safety issues in light of September 1 1 and some fear that nuclear plants will be attractive targets for terrorists. However, commercial nuclear plants are probably the most physically secure and least vulnerable of our nation's industrial infrastructure. They are robust, hardened facilities with numerous redundant systems designed to assure public safety, and are subject to close regulation by the NRC. Comprehensive NRC security requirements, including physical protection systems, armed guards, and strict access controls, are mandated for all nuclear plants. This article explores the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to acts of terrorism. We describe the physical, security, and emergency response requirements applicable to nuclear plants and consider whether NRC security requirements can serve as a model for improving security at other infrastructure as well. We also explore policy issues concerning the appropriate division of responsibility between industrial security and national defense, considering whether protection from terrorism should be a governmental or industrial obligation, as well as the societal costs of adopting a policy of "zero" risk from terrorist actions.