Anthropocentrism with a human face

Abstract There is a widely held belief that there are moral limits to what we can do to non-human living beings. This has inspired various varieties of non-anthropocentric ethics. Whether rights- or welfare-oriented, the focus has been on the organisms’ interests. The ability of these theories to explain the moral significance of interests and, more generally, to identify the source of obligation in ethics, is questioned. The metaphor of a game is provided, with the rules of a game, as a model for what can give obligational significance. A Kantian-oriented view of ethics is developed from the model, providing a source for inter-human liberty-rights. Concerning such rights, animals are clearly neither agents nor patients. It is argued that inter-human moral relationships also involve welfare issues. In fact the meaning of ethics is dependent on the welfare aspect. Pre-moral compassion provides direction for the principal task of ethics: to bring compassion out of a particular realm of kindness and under the equity requirements of ethics. This effort demands respect for the welfare of all others, including non-humans. It further condemns acts of wanton destruction, even when no sentient being is the victim. Animals, plants and the environment are therefore the prima facie beneficiaries of an inter-human morality. The moral belief that morality is an issue in human–nature relationships is thereby integrated into an anthropocentric ethic.