CEO power, disclosure quality and the variability of firm performance: Evidence from China

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate how disclosure quality affects the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the variability of firm performance. Moreover, it also examines the impacts of ownership structure and disclosure quality on the relationship between CEO power and performance variability. Design/methodology/approach - Empirical research was carried out. Findings - It was found that: first, firms whose CEOs have more power will exhibit higher performance, but display more variability in firm performance. Second, disclosure quality can affect the relationship between CEO power and the variability of firm performance and more specifically, increase in disclosure quality reduces the performance variability caused by CEO power. Third, the effects of CEO power on the variability of firm performance are higher in state-owned firms than in non-state-owned firms. Moreover, the effect of higher disclosure quality for lowering the variability of firm performance is stronger in state-owned firms than in non-state-owned firms. Practical implications - First, the authors find that when evaluating corporate governance practices, both firm performance and the variability of firm performance should be taken into account. Second, this paper fills the void in the extant literatures by demonstrating that CEO power, as well as disclosure quality, can affect firms' operational risk. Third, for firm owners, when firms are facing large uncertainty from institutional environment, a great trade-off between firm performance and operational risk, when determining the degree of CEO power, will play an important role in corporate governance. Originality/value - This paper complements the extant literatures by examining the impacts of CEO power to firm output from the dimensions of both firm performance and operational risk; and by examining the impacts of ownership structure and disclosure quality on the relationship between CEO power and performance variability.