The philosophical concept of a human body

THE ARGUMENT from analogy for the existence of other minds has been repeatedly attacked on two general counts. Its defenders have long been criticized for attempting to justify the inference that other "bodies" are associated with minds by an appeal merely to one's own case, while more recently the intelligibility of the concept of mind which the formulation of such an inference requires has been seriously challenged. Nothing has been said, however, about difficulties that come to light when the other half of the Cartesian dualism is given careful scrutiny. In this paper I will argue (i) that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; (2) that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and (3) that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is the offspring of confusion and so requires no solution.