In Whom Collectivists Trust: The Role of (in)Voluntary Social Obligations in Japan (集体主义者信任谁:自愿与非自愿社会义务在日本的作用)

2013 
This study contributes to an emic understanding of how different types of social obligations may help or hinder the formation of initial organizational trust within collectivist cultures. We extend prior social categorization insights by challenging the expectation that in‐group favouritism automatically facilitates higher levels of initial trust among collectivists. We theorize and test the asymmetric effects of two different types of social obligations toward members of distinct social categories (kinship and friendship in‐groups) on the formation of initial organizational trust. Using a quasi‐experimental research design in a collectivist culture (Japan), we hypothesize and show that in ambivalent situations, voluntary social obligations toward members of friendship in‐groups encourage early trust in trustees' organizations; however, involuntary social obligations toward members of kinship in‐groups discourage early trust development toward the organization these trustees represent. The effects of (in)voluntary social obligations on initial organizational trust are contingent on how collectivists perceive each encounter: voluntary social obligations are more conducive to trust‐building at lower levels of perceived opportunity; involuntary social obligations have stronger effects on initial organizational trust at higher levels of perceived risk. 摘要. 本研究的贡献在于促进理解在集体主义文化内部,不同类型的社会义务如何帮助或阻碍初始组织信任的形成。我们通过挑战这样一种想法,即对于“内部人”的偏好会自动促进集体主义者之间形成较高的初始信任,而拓展了此前关于社会分类的理解。我们理论化并实证检验了对不同社会类别成员(亲属和朋友)的两种不同类型的社会义务对于初始组织信任的形成有不对称影响。通过在一个集体主义文化国家(日本)进行准实验研究,我们假设并验证了在兼有机会与风险的情形下,对于朋友型“内部人”的自愿社会义务促进了对这些受信任人所在组织的早期信任;然而,对于亲属型“内部人”的非自愿社会义务抑制了对这些受信任人所代表的组织形成早期信任。并且,自愿与非自愿的社会义务对于初始组织信任的影响还取决于集体主义者如何感知当次互动:自愿的社会义务对信任构建的促进作用在感知到的机会处于较低水平时更强;非自愿的社会义务对初始的组织信任的影响在感知到的风险处于较高水平时更强。
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