Балансирование ценностей и ценность балансирования (часть первая)

The article discusses the specific mode of existence of values – balancing or op­timization when it comes to deontological values. The authors using examples of values such as the principles of law and human rights, the rules of balancing are analyzed, which, according to G. Hart's classification, are secondary norms. The critical issue for the legal balancing procedure is the relationship between legal reality and values as such. Are the constitutional and legal values set by the Basic Law (Constitution), or do they objectively exist in society as a general (pre-constitutional) order of values? Should the Basic Law be confined to its own text and remain value-neutral in this sense? Are legal values purely deonto­logical, or can they be related to utilitarian goals and interests? The second part of the article explores the value of balancing as one of the methods for resolving the most complex legal conflicts. The well-known dispute between J. Habermas and R. Alexy about the admissibility of balancing of human rights demonstrates how complex and philosophically rich the legal balancing procedure is. Based on Luhmann’s concept of the cognitive openness of law, at the end of the article, the authors substantiate their own position on the role of values in modernjustice.