Simulation: A strategy for mindreading similar but not dissimilar others?

Abstract One proposed solution to the challenge of mentalizing is to use one's own mind as a model in a process known as simulation. Studies have demonstrated that people more strongly engage in simulation for individuals to whom they feel more similar, such that people assume that the self is like more similar others (and unlike more dissimilar others) even in attitudes that are irrelevant to reasons for perceiving similarity (e.g., group membership). The present 3 studies (total N = 193) evaluate this strategy using three kinds of groups, both real and novel, that participants may feel differentially similar about. These studies conceptually replicate past work, finding that people simulate when reasoning about more similar others, despite the attitudes in question being irrelevant to group membership. Additionally, these studies find that the more similar people feel to a target, the more correct people are about the attitudes of individuals in a target's group. These findings suggest that although people may simulate more strongly for more similar others even when attitudes are irrelevant to group membership, it may be wrong to think that the self is unlike more dissimilar others. Finally, the present studies provide preliminary evidence that when perceivers' attitudes are unlike most others' attitudes, such that simulation could be inappropriate, perceivers do not appropriately correct the extent to which they simulate for more similar others. These results suggest that there are limitations to the strategy of selectively simulating for more similar others in order to understand others' minds.