Friction in War: The Effects of Climate, Disease, and Morale at the Battle of Labadieville

The American Civil War has been viewed as the last Napoleonic war. Two of the most renowned military writers of the post-Napoleonic period were the Baron de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. Both Jomini and Clausewitz studied the Napoleonic wars and based their theories upon them. The American Civil War, thus, can be viewed as a proving ground for such theories. This paper introduces a relatively small engagement in a remote corner of the American conflict to illustrate and analyze Jominian and Clausewitzian theory and practice. In its simplicity, the 1862 Battle of Labadieville is ideal. Both commanders and their armies were trained in the Napoleonic art of war, and attempted for the most part to implement Napoleonic strategy and tactics. An analysis of this battle serves the purpose of bringing attention to a grossly neglected, yet significant, theater of the war, while providing a refreshing approach to the study of war, in particular, the application of Clausewitz’s theory on friction in war. Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work Vom Krieg discussed the unpredictable nature of warfare. Despite the best laid plans, the preciseness of calculations, and the adherence to preparations, things tend to go awry. Minor incidents combine to lower overall performance. “War is the province of chance and uncertainty,” he wrote. 1 What he referred to as friction retards or obstructs intended courses of action. The effect of friction in war can lead to defeat in battle. These so-called frictions vary and can affect outcomes to different degrees; however, three of them—climate, disease, and morale—were prevalent enough at the 27 October 1862 American Civil War Battle of Labadieville to influence results. 2