Comparators in multiple discrimination cases: a real problem or just a theory?

Suppose a black man of Ghanaian descent applies for a job at a Dutch homecare organization and, to his disappointment, is refused the position. After inquiring, he learns that the main reason for this lies in the fact that he is male since, in the experience of the organization, clients regularly refuse to be helped by male nurses. Furthermore, his being black would supposedly increase the possibility that he would not be accepted by clients.1 This may be considered a typical example of multiple discrimination; the man in question is discriminated against on both accounts. Legal scholars dealing with such cases distinguish two forms of multiple discrimination. In case of additive discrimination, discrimination grounds ‘add to each other’ and may therefore be distinguished from one another.2 In contrast, intersectional discrimination, a concept introduced by the legal scholar Kimberly Crenshaw in 1989, refers to the situation in which the discrimination grounds ‘intersect with each other’ and therefore cannot be disentangled, resulting in a specific form of discrimination.3 Crenshaw emphasised the problematic consequences of the dominant single-ground approach in American anti-discrimination law, denying protection against work-life discrimination for black women, who were being discriminated against not as women, not as blacks, but as black women. Cases of additive discrimination may be dealt with on just one of the grounds. However, for the people involved, who are convinced that they were discriminated on