Cooperation Stimulation and Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks — A Power-Efficient Bayesian Game Approach

In wireless ad hoc networks (WANETs), collaboration among nodes is usually inefficient and the network is vulnerable to various attacks. Although some intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and reputation strategies have been proposed to enhance the network's robustness, the significant power consumption they cause will reduce the networks' lifetime. In this paper, we propose a power-efficient mechanism based on game theoretic analysis to improve the security of WANETs and stimulate the cooperation among nodes. Specifically, we introduce two detection modes for the IDS and formulate the interactions between malicious/regular nodes and IDSs as a Bayesian game. The Nash equilibrium strategies in static Bayesian game model is firstly analyzed, which can not only reduce the probability of misbehaviors (e.g., attacks and non-cooperations) but also prolong the IDS's service time. Then, We extend the static game to a multi-stage imperfect dynamic Bayesian game, in which the IDS updates its belief based on observations and nodes' equilibrium strategy will also change accordingly. Finally, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) knowledge is applied to analyze this game, based on which the optimal monitoring scheme for IDS is made out. Simulations on two typical networks demonstrate the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed approach.