In Self Interest? Meritocracy in a Bureaucracy

Bureaucracies often design rules and constrain discretion in order to avoid nepotism. Yet such rules may not be necessary in cases where the interests of the decision-maker and the bureaucracy are aligned. I examine discretionary promotions of junior Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) bureaucrats by their seniors, a setting where corruption and nepotism are presumed to be the norm. I compile unique data on the abilities of junior officers, including both publicly available recruitment exam rank and information on job performance that is private to senior officials. Results show that seniors use both public and private information meritocratically in making these "fast-track" promotions and are most selective and meritocratic when choosing and promoting juniors for their own team. These results show that even in a notably rigid and nepotistic setting information and discretion can be harnessed through self-interest to bolster meritocracy.