An Analog of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem.II. Examples of $$V$$-Balanced Fuzzy Games

This paper continues the research work [2], which generalizes the well-known Bondareva–Shapley theorem to the case of fuzzy cooperative $$n$$ -player games. The conditions of $$V $$ -balancedness are studied for three classes of fuzzy games as follows: 1) fuzzy transferable utility (TU) market games [3]; 2) fuzzy games associated with the linear-production models [6]; 3) fuzzy games generated by the rational distribution models of public costs during the construction of transport infrastructure facilities (the so-called airport games [5]). In addition to the conditions guaranteeing the non-emptiness of the cores, some types of non-dominated imputations of these games are also described. For the fuzzy airport games, such a description is exhaustive.