Designing a 3rd generation, authenticatable attribute measurement system

Attribute measurement systems (AMS) are designed to measure potentially sensitive items containing Special Nuclear Materials to determine if the items possess attributes which fall within an agreed-upon range. Such systems could be used in a treaty to inspect and verify the identity of items in storage without revealing any sensitive information associated with the item. An AMS needs to satisfy two constraints: the host party needs to be sure that none of their sensitive information is released, while the inspecting party wants to have confidence that the limited amount of information they see accurately reflects the properties of the item being measured. The former involves 'certifying' the system and the latter 'authenticating' it. Previous work into designing and building AMS systems have focused more on the questions of certifiability than on the questions of authentication - although a few approaches have been investigated. The next step is to build a 3rd generation AMS which (1) makes the appropriate measurements, (2) can be certified, and (3) can be authenticated (the three generations). This paper will discuss the ideas, options, and process of producing a design for a 3rd generation AMS.