Collaboration in Development of New Drugs

The development of a new drug is costly and uncertain. As such, pharmaceutical firms often collaborate to develop new drugs. We examine the conditions under which firms should collaborate rather than compete in new drug development in this paper. We model the collaboration versus competition decision problem for two firms using a game-theoretic model and drive the collaboration conditions. Our research demonstrates that development cost and uncertainties in drug treatment efficacy and safety and patient enrollment, which results in uncertain FDA approval, revenue, and market exclusivity periods, drive the collaboration or competition decision for firms. We establish conditions based on probability of success of drug development, cost rates, and market potential under which the firms should collaborate, and show that there exist scenarios under which the firms would actually collaborate on the lower efficacy drug. As such, firms need to carefully take into consideration various factors such as the probability of success, the potential market share, and the development cost of each competing drug when determining whether to collaborate or compete in developing new drugs. Finally, we apply our analytical model to illustrate a case study involving collaboration between Bristol-Myers Squib and Pfizer.