Securing content-centric networks with content-based encryption

Abstract As content is transmitted in content-driven manner in the content-centric network (CCN), it does not require any host address; therefore, it is infeasible to establish a traditional secure channel between hosts. Securing the content transmission in the CCN is a challenging problem. We solve this problem with the content-based encryption, where the encryption key is associated with the content itself, and the private decryption keys are distributed to the authorized consumers. To deal with the security requirements for content-based encryption, we define a security model that captures the key existential unforgeability and semantic security. We then propose a content-based encryption scheme with short ciphertexts, which is proven to be strong key existentially unforgeable and semantically secure in the standard model. We apply the scheme to construct a secure content transmission protocol in the CCN, which captures the security properties of content confidentiality, integrity, resistance to replay attacks and resistance to key forgery attacks. The performance analysis shows that our protocol is efficient for large content transmission.