Johnson, MacIntyre, and the Practice of Argumentation

This article is a discussion of Ralph Johnson's concept of practice of argumentation. Such practice is characterized by three properties: (1) It is teleological, (2) it is dialectical, and (3) it is manifestly rational. I argue that Johnson's preferred definition of practice—which is Alasdair MacIntyre's concept of practice as a human activity with internal goods accessible through part- cipation in that same activity—does not fit these properties or features. I also suggest that this failure should not require Johnson to adjust the properties to make them fit the practice concept. While MacIntyre's concept of practice clearly has some attractive features, it does not provide what Johnson wants from a concept of practice. Resume: Dans cet article on discute du concept de la pratique d'argumen- tation avancee par Ralph Johnson. Une telle pratique a trois proprietes : elle est teleologique, dialectique, et manifestement rationnelle. Mais la definition preferee de Johnson de la pratique—concue par Alasdair Mac- Intyre comme une activite avec des biens internes accessibles en y parti- cipant—ne s'accorde pas bien avec ces proprietes. Je suggere que cette faiblesse n'oblige pas Johnson a ajus- ter ces proprietes a son concept de pratique. Quoique le concept de pra- tique de MacIntyre a evidemment quelques traits attrayants, il n'offre pas ce que Johnson veut d'un concept de pratique.