Experiencing the enactment of beliefs

The main goal of our study is to research the experiential aspect of the enactment of belief. Our main assumption is that belief is not a fixed structure (representation) but is enacted every time we examine (probe) it in a more or less unique way. We consider the process of enactment of belief as a constitutive part of belief itself. The term enaction, coined by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) is used, to denote the middle way between the emergence of a fixed memory, and the construction of entirely new experience. We model the enactment of belief as influenced by individual's conceptual framework and his or her perception of the particular communication situation. The influence of the latter is the principal research interest of our study. In order to research first-person experience, the study is conducted in a form of in-depth comparative phenomenological case study. Elicitation interviews (Petitmengin, 2006) are combined with are search journals of experiences of belief enactments. In the first phase of the study, the participants are asked common known pre-defined questions in order to form beliefs (i.e. what is Oedipus complex), after answering, they are asked to describe their experience of the enactment of these beliefs. In second phase, the participants become co-researchers, as they are asked to – aided by their research journals - observe their experiences in different communication situations. Journal entries are post festum examined in elicitation interview. This type of study gives insight into understanding personal epistemological view points, which are essential for the understanding of constructing individual realities. Preliminary results show considerable individual differences in the process of enactment of belief. !!References: [1] F. J. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. [2] C. Petitmengin, “Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness,” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive sciences, vol. 5 (3-4), S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, Eds. Netherlands, Springer, 2006, pp. 229-269.