On Embodiment Research and its Descriptiveness

Researchers’ interest in embodied cognition has grown dramatically over the last 30 years. Despite its increasing popularity, embodiment research has been met with a bit of criticism on its allegedly "descriptive" nature. Being a literature analysis on such “descriptiveness”, this paper purports to provide an apology for the alleged shortcoming and to quest for alternative methodologies that may serve to remedy them. This paper begins with introducing major theoretical models in the embodiment research, followed by an attempt to categorize the descriptiveness allegations. Descriptiveness critiques may be classified into the following three perceptions: less than satisfactory theoretical background; lacking in formal and computational process models; and well-expounding on what relationship there exists but falling short of explaining how, when, and why such relationship holds. We then attempt to offer an apology for the descriptiveness by establishing that each of the perceptions may be overstated and undeserving. Lastly, we seek for alternative research methodologies to mitigate the descriptiveness shortcomings in embodiment research and propose the following: moving toward phenomenon-driven research; incorporating more behavioral measures into its empirical studies; and implementing more field research.