A priori tudás és filozófiai megismerés = A priori knowledge and philosophical thought

A palyazat kereteben (1) felallitottunk egy konvencionalista elmeletet a logikai igazsagrol, mely feltehetően kiterjeszthető a matematikaira igazsagra; (2) elemeztuk az intuicio szerepet Husserl es Heidegger munkassagaban, es megvilagitottuk a kettejuk kozotti kulonbsegeket; (3) vedelmeztuk az intuiciok filozofiai felhasznalasat a kiserleti filozofia nyujtotta kritika elleneben; (4) biraltuk Chalmers felfogasat az elgondolhatosagi ervekről, es javaslatot tettunk Yablo elkepzelesenek tovabbfejlesztesere; (5) vedelmunkbe vettuk az analitikus metafizikat mint alapvetően antikantianus es revizionista vallalkozast; (6) fenomenologiai ertelmezest kinaltunk Nietzsche genealogiajara, mely szerint a genealogiai a torteneti a priori fellazitasara iranyulo szabadsag-elvű vallalkozas; (7) feltartuk, hogy a filozofia Heidegger es Gadamer nevevel femjelzett hermeneutikai fordulata mikent formalta at az a priori fogalmat es valtoztatta meg annak jelentőseget (8); valaszoltunk az analitikus filozofiai bizonyos fenomenologiai kritikaira, es megvizsgaltunk, hogy a fenomenologia mikent jarulhat hozza az analitikus elmefilozofiahoz. Eredmenyeink azt sugalljak, hogy az a felfogas, mely a filozofia es a tudomany elhatarolasat az a priori es az empirikus megkulonboztetese reven szandekozik megtenni, nem kulonoskeppen gyumolcsoző. | Within the framework of the project we (1) put forward a conventionalist account of logical truth, which can be possibly extended to mathematical truth; (2) explored the role of intuition in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy and highlighted how their accounts differ; (3) defended the use of intuitive judgments in philosophy against the criticism offered by experimental philosophy; (4) took issue with the Chalmers’s account of conceivability arguments and offered a new account which is an elaboration of Yablo’s approach; (5) described and defended the project of contemporary analytic metaphysics as a fundamentally anti-Kantian and revisionary enterprise; (6) offered a phenomenological interpretation of Nietzsche’s genealogy as an attempt at loosening the hold historical a priori has over us; (7) analyzed how the concept and the significance of the a priori has been transformed as a result of the hermeneutic turn in philosophy advocated by Heidegger and Gadamer; (8) defended analytic philosophy against some criticism by phenomenologists and explored the ways in which phenomenology may contribute to analytic philosophy of mind. Our results suggest the distinction between philosophy and science in terms of a priori and empirical character is not particularly revealing.