PBKDF2

In cryptography, PBKDF1 and PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) are key derivation functions with a sliding computational cost, used to reduce vulnerabilities to brute force attacks. In cryptography, PBKDF1 and PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) are key derivation functions with a sliding computational cost, used to reduce vulnerabilities to brute force attacks. PBKDF2 is part of RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, specifically PKCS #5 v2.0, also published as Internet Engineering Task Force's RFC 2898. It supersedes PBKDF1, which could only produce derived keys up to 160 bits long. RFC 8018, published in 2017, recommends PBKDF2 for password hashing. PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function, such as hash-based message authentication code (HMAC), to the input password or passphrase along with a salt value and repeats the process many times to produce a derived key, which can then be used as a cryptographic key in subsequent operations. The added computational work makes password cracking much more difficult, and is known as key stretching. When the standard was written in the year 2000 the recommended minimum number of iterations was 1000, but the parameter is intended to be increased over time as CPU speeds increase. A Kerberos standard in 2005 recommended 4096 iterations; Apple reportedly used 2000 for iOS 3, and 10000 for iOS 4; while LastPass in 2011 used 5000 iterations for JavaScript clients and 100000 iterations for server-side hashing. Having a salt added to the password reduces the ability to use precomputed hashes (rainbow tables) for attacks, and means that multiple passwords have to be tested individually, not all at once. The standard recommends a salt length of at least 64 bits. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology recommends a salt length of 128 bits. The PBKDF2 key derivation function has five input parameters: