Definite description

A definite description is a denoting phrase in the form of 'the X' where X is a noun-phrase or a singular common noun. The definite description is proper if X applies to a unique individual or object. For example: 'the first person in space' and 'the 42nd President of the United States of America', are proper. The definite descriptions 'the person in space' and 'the Senator from Ohio' are improper because the noun phrase X applies to more than one thing, and the definite descriptions 'the first man on Mars' and 'the Senator from some Country' are improper because X applies to nothing. Improper descriptions raise some difficult questions about the law of excluded middle, denotation, modality, and mental content. A definite description is a denoting phrase in the form of 'the X' where X is a noun-phrase or a singular common noun. The definite description is proper if X applies to a unique individual or object. For example: 'the first person in space' and 'the 42nd President of the United States of America', are proper. The definite descriptions 'the person in space' and 'the Senator from Ohio' are improper because the noun phrase X applies to more than one thing, and the definite descriptions 'the first man on Mars' and 'the Senator from some Country' are improper because X applies to nothing. Improper descriptions raise some difficult questions about the law of excluded middle, denotation, modality, and mental content. As France is currently a republic, it has no king. Bertrand Russell pointed out that this raises a puzzle about the truth value of the sentence 'The present King of France is bald.' The sentence does not seem to be true: if we consider all the bald things, the present King of France isn't among them, since there is no present King of France. But if it is false, then one would expect that the negation of this statement, that is, 'It is not the case that the present King of France is bald,' or its logical equivalent, 'The present King of France is not bald,' is true. But this sentence doesn't seem to be true either: the present King of France is no more among the things that fail to be bald than among the things that are bald. We therefore seem to have a violation of the Law of Excluded Middle. Is it meaningless, then? One might suppose so (and some philosophers have; see below) since 'the present King of France' certainly does fail to refer. But on the other hand, the sentence 'The present King of France is bald' (as well as its negation) seem perfectly intelligible, suggesting that 'the Present King of France' can't be meaningless. Russell proposed to resolve this puzzle via his theory of descriptions. A definite description like 'the present King of France', he suggested, isn't a referring expression, as we might naively suppose, but rather an 'incomplete symbol' that introduces quantificational structure into sentences in which it occurs. The sentence 'the present King of France is bald', for example, is analyzed as a conjunction of the following three quantified statements: