De-Stalinization (Russian: десталинизация, destalinizatsiya) consisted of a series of political reforms in the Soviet Union after the death of long-time dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953, and the ascension of Nikita Khrushchev to power. De-Stalinization (Russian: десталинизация, destalinizatsiya) consisted of a series of political reforms in the Soviet Union after the death of long-time dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953, and the ascension of Nikita Khrushchev to power. The reforms consisted of changing or removing key institutions that helped Stalin hold power: the cult of personality that surrounded him, the Stalinist political system, and the Gulag labour-camp system, all of which had been created by Stalin was succeeded by a collective leadership after his death in March 1953, consisting of Georgi Malenkov, Premier of the Soviet Union; Lavrentiy Beria, head of the Ministry of the Interior; and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The term 'de-Stalinization' is one which gained currency in both Russia and the Western world following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and was never used during the Khrushchev era. However, de-Stalinization efforts were set forth at this time by Nikita Khrushchev and the Government of the Soviet Union under the guise of the 'overcoming/exposure of the cult of personality', with a heavy criticism of Joseph Stalin's 'era of the cult of personality'. However, prior to Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' to the 20th Party Congress, no direct association between Stalin as a person and 'the cult of personality' was openly made by Khrushchev or others within the party, although archival documents show that strong criticism of Stalin and his ideology featured in private discussions by Khruschchev at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. There were dangers in denouncing Stalin as he was placed on a pedestal both at home and among communists abroad. In the years 1953–1955, a period of 'silent de-Stalinization' took place, as the revision of Stalin's policies was done in secret, and often with no explanation. This period saw a number of non-publicised political rehabilitations, (such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Politburo members Robert Eikhe and Jānis Rudzutaks, and those executed in the Leningrad Affair) and the release of 'Article 58ers'. However, due to the huge influx of prisoners returning from the camps (90,000 prisoners in 1954–55 alone), this could not continue. In December 1955 Khrushchev proposed a commission to be set up in order to investigate Stalin's activities on behalf of the Presidium; this investigation found out that out of the 1,920,635 arrested for anti-Soviet activities – who were arrested on fabricated evidence in the first place and confessed under torture authorized by Stalin – 688,503 were executed. De-Stalinization meant an end to the role of large-scale forced labour in the economy. The process of freeing Gulag prisoners was started by Lavrentiy Beria. He was soon removed from power, arrested on 26 June 1953, and executed on 24 December 1953. Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the most powerful Soviet politician. While de-Stalinization had been quietly underway ever since Stalin's death, the watershed event was Khrushchev's speech entitled 'On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences', concerning Stalin. On 25 February 1956, he spoke to a closed session of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivering an address laying out some of Stalin's crimes and the 'conditions of insecurity, fear, and even desperation' created by Stalin. Khrushchev shocked his listeners by denouncing Stalin's dictatorial rule and his cult of personality as inconsistent with communist and Party ideology. Among other points, he condemned the treatment of the Old Bolsheviks, people who had supported communism before the revolution, many of whom Stalin had executed as traitors. Khrushchev also attacked the crimes committed by associates of Beria. One reason given for Khrushchev's speech was his moral conscience; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn said that Khrushchev spoke out of a 'movement of the heart'. This, the Communists believed, would prevent a fatal loss of self-belief and restore unity within the Party. Martin McCauley argues that Khrushchev's purpose was to 'liberate Party officials from the fear of repression'. Khrushchev argued that if the Party were to be an efficient mechanism, stripped from the brutal abuse of power by any individual, it could transform the Soviet Union as well as the entire world.