Politics of memory

Politics of memory is the organisation of collective memory by political agents; the political means by which events are remembered and recorded, or discarded. Eventually, politics of memory may determine the way history is written and passed on. Memories are also influenced by cultural forces, e.g. popular culture, as well as social norms. It has also been connected with the construction of identity. Politics of memory is the organisation of collective memory by political agents; the political means by which events are remembered and recorded, or discarded. Eventually, politics of memory may determine the way history is written and passed on. Memories are also influenced by cultural forces, e.g. popular culture, as well as social norms. It has also been connected with the construction of identity. The two sides in the conflict in Cyprus maintain widely divergent and contrasting memories of the events that split the island. The term selective memory is applied by psychologists to people suffering from head injuries who retain some memories, but have amnesia about others. Societal trauma, such as war, seems to have a similar effect. Recollections that are shaped out of a phenomenon common to many countries traumatized by war and repression, may be remembered in radically different ways by people who experienced similar events. The selectivity may also serve a political purpose, for example to justify the claims of one group over a competing group. Cyprus is a poignant case for this phenomenon. The longstanding conflict on the island reflects deep roots in the 'motherlands' of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot peoples. In Germany, Politics of memory (Geschichtspolitik) is most often associated with how to memorise the national socialist era and World War II. Often different events of this era have been measured against one another and, in this way, evaluated, e.g. the Holocaust, the war against Eastern Europe with its ethnic cleansing programs, but also the bombings of city's by German and Allied forces alike or the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe. Speeches by politicians often deal with issues of how to memorise the past. Richard von Weizsäcker as Bundespräsident identified two modes of memorising the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 in his famous 1985 speech: this date can be seen as defeat or liberation. Weizsäcker backed the latter Interpretation. In this regard, such moments as the first official 'Day of Commemoration for Victims of National Socialism', on January 20, 1996, led to Bundespräsident Roman Herzog remarking in his address to the German Parliament that 'Remembrance gives us strength, since it helps to keep us from going astray.' In similar, but somewhat opposing measure, Gerhard Schröder sought to move beyond this in saying the generation that committed such deeds has passed, and a new generation does not have the same fault because they simply weren't there to be responsible. Good examples for politics of memory could be seen in national monuments and the discourses surrounding their construction. The construction of a holocaust memorial in memory of the murdered Jews of Europe at a central location in Berlin was met with protests but also with strong support. Likewise the National Memorial to the Victims of War and Tyranny was deemed inappropriate by some onlookers and a discussion revolved around the question whether the lack of a differentiation between victims and perpetrators is adequate or not. The question if and how to memorise Germans expelled from Poland in the aftermath of World War II has been constantly debated in both West Germany and Poland. Such questions are so difficult because it requires a moral judgement of these events. These judgements differ remarkably. For instance, the Federation of German Expellees called on Poland to pay compensation for lost property to Germans from what after 1945 became Polish territory, a claim that is consistently declined by Poland. Similarly there have been debates in Germany whether the legacy of World War II implies that Germany's military should be confined to purely defensive measure like peacekeeping or, contrary to this, this legacy can be a justification of an active enforcement of human rights which also might involve preemptive strikes.