Informal logic

Informal logic, intuitively, refers to the principles of logic and logical thought outside of a formal setting. However, perhaps because of the 'informal' in the title, the precise definition of 'informal logic' is a matter of some dispute. Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair define informal logic as 'a branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of argumentation.' This definition reflects what had been implicit in their practice and what others were doing in their informal logic texts. Informal logic, intuitively, refers to the principles of logic and logical thought outside of a formal setting. However, perhaps because of the 'informal' in the title, the precise definition of 'informal logic' is a matter of some dispute. Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair define informal logic as 'a branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of argumentation.' This definition reflects what had been implicit in their practice and what others were doing in their informal logic texts. Informal logic is associated with (informal) fallacies, critical thinking, the thinking skills movement and the interdisciplinary inquiry known as argumentation theory. Frans H. van Eemeren writes that the label 'informal logic' covers a 'collection of normative approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that remain closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic.' Informal logic as a distinguished enterprise under this name emerged roughly in the late 1970s as a sub-field of philosophy. The naming of the field was preceded by the appearance of a number of textbooks that rejected the symbolic approach to logic on pedagogical grounds as inappropriate and unhelpful for introductory textbooks on logic for a general audience, for example Howard Kahane's Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, subtitled 'The Use of Reason in Everyday Life', first published in 1971. Kahane's textbook was described on the notice of his death in the Proceedings And Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2002) as 'a text in informal logic, was intended to enable students to cope with the misleading rhetoric one frequently finds in the media and in political discourse. It was organized around a discussion of fallacies, and was meant to be a practical instrument for dealing with the problems of everyday life. ... gone through many editions; ... still in print; and the thousands upon thousands of students who have taken courses in which his text ... used can thank Howard for contributing to their ability to dissect arguments and avoid the deceptions of deceitful rhetoric. He tried to put into practice the ideal of discourse that aims at truth rather than merely at persuasion. (Hausman et al. 2002)' Other textbooks from the era taking this approach were Michael Scriven's Reasoning (Edgepress, 1976) and Logical Self-Defense by Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, first published in 1977. Earlier precursors in this tradition can be considered Monroe Beardsley's Practical Logic (1950) and Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument (1958). The field perhaps became recognized under its current name with the First International Symposium on Informal Logic held in 1978. Although initially motivated by a new pedagogical approach to undergraduate logic textbooks, the scope of the field was basically defined by a list of 13 problems and issues which Blair and Johnson included as an appendix to their keynote address at this symposium: David Hitchcock argues that the naming of the field was unfortunate, and that philosophy of argument would have been more appropriate. He argues that more undergraduate students in North America study informal logic than any other branch of philosophy, but that as of 2003 informal logic (or philosophy of argument) was not recognized as separate sub-field by the World Congress of Philosophy. Frans H. van Eemeren wrote that 'informal logic' is mainly an approach to argumentation advanced by a group of US and Canadian philosophers and largely based on the previous works of Stephen Toulmin and to a lesser extent those of Chaïm Perelman. Alongside the symposia, since 1983 the journal Informal Logic has been the publication of record of the field, with Blair and Johnson as initial editors, with the editorial board now including two other colleagues from the University of Windsor—Christopher Tindale and Hans V. Hansen. Other journals that regularly publish articles on informal logic include Argumentation (founded in 1986), Philosophy and Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advocacy (the journal of the American Forensic Association), and Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines (founded in 1988). Johnson and Blair (2000) proposed the following definition: 'Informal logic designates that branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal2 standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse.' Their meaning of non-formal2 is taken from Barth and Krabbe (1982), which is explained below. To understand the definition above, one must understand 'informal' which takes its meaning in contrast to its counterpart 'formal.' (This point was not made for a very long time, hence the nature of informal logic remained opaque, even to those involved in it, for a period of time.) Here it is helpful to have recourse to Barth and Krabbe (1982:14f) where they distinguish three senses of the term 'form.' By 'form1,' Barth and Krabbe mean the sense of the term which derives from the Platonic idea of form—the ultimate metaphysical unit. Barth and Krabbe claim that most traditional logic is formal in this sense. That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms could naturally be understood as place-holders for Platonic (or Aristotelian) forms. In this first sense of 'form,' almost all logic is informal (not-formal). Understanding informal logic this way would be much too broad to be useful. By 'form2,' Barth and Krabbe mean the form of sentences and statements as these are understood in modern systems of logic. Here validity is the focus: if the premises are true, the conclusion must then also be true. Now validity has to do with the logical form of the statement that makes up the argument. In this sense of 'formal,' most modern and contemporary logic is 'formal.' That is, such logics canonize the notion of logical form, and the notion of validity plays the central normative role. In this second sense of form, informal logic is not-formal, because it abandons the notion of logical form as the key to understanding the structure of arguments, and likewise retires validity as normative for the purposes of the evaluation of argument. It seems to many that validity is too stringent a requirement, that there are good arguments in which the conclusion is supported by the premises even though it does not follow necessarily from them (as validity requires). An argument in which the conclusion is thought to be 'beyond reasonable doubt, given the premises' is sufficient in law to cause a person to be sentenced to death, even though it does not meet the standard of logical validity. This type of argument, based on accumulation of evidence rather than pure deduction, is called a conductive argument.