Combining studies on CEO personality traits and real options theory, we propose that the firm’s strategic flexibility can be improved by CEO openness to experience but worsened by CEO conscientiousness and neuroticism. We construct the degree of strategic flexibility by exploring the firm’s ability to take advantage of heightened volatility, which results in superior stock returns. Our results suggest that adaptability is fostered by creativity and diverse thinking (openness to experience) and is impeded by rigid planning, resistance to change (conscientiousness), and lack of emotional stability (neuroticism). However, for firms that experience decreased volatility, the opposite holds. Thus, in line with trait activation theory, our results imply that the effect of specific CEO personality traits on performance is contingent and context-specific. Our findings are economically significant and have important implications concerning both CEO selection and management.
We investigate the effect of top managers' myopia on firms' market valuation. We devise a measure of expected CEO tenure as a proxy of the length of CEO decision horizon. After accounting for the endogenous nature of CEO horizon, our empirical tests show that it is significantly associated with agency costs and provide strong support for the hypotheses that the length of CEO decision horizon has a positive influence on firm value and a negative effect on information risk. The results are consistent with the notion that a short CEO decision horizon is indicative of preference for investments that offer relatively faster paybacks at the expense of long-term value creation.
Abstract Utilising a novel proxy for CEO religiosity that is based on graduation from a religious university, we document evidence that a CEO’s religiosity improves financial reporting quality. This effect is more pronounced when the firm is located in an area with higher geographical religiosity or more social capital, suggesting that a favourable environment facilitates the CEO religiosity effect. We also find that analyst forecasts are more accurate for firms led by a religious CEO, and that fewer analysts follow such firms, consistent with the view that there is less need for analyst service if the firm provides high‐quality information. We develop a series of tests to alleviate endogeneity concerns, including a reverse causality test, a difference‐in‐differences test based on a sample of exogenous CEO turnovers, and a placebo test. Our evidence suggests a causal explanation of the effect of CEO religiosity on financial reporting quality.
Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add Paper to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely Copy URL Copy DOI
Abstract We explore investment efficiency before and after a spin‐off to assess whether post‐spinoff managerial structure helps maintain investment efficiency. Our findings reveal that the investment efficiency of parent firms remains significant when there is a clear separation of management between the parent and spun‐off firms. However, a considerable decline in efficiency is observed after the spin‐off in cases where there is overlapping management. This decrease in efficiency is particularly pronounced when the parent and spun‐off firms operate in different industries and are geographically distant from each other. Furthermore, we show that inefficient alignment of incentives for the overlapped management exacerbates this decline in investment efficiency.
'%3e%3cg id='b'%3e%3cpath id='a' stroke='%23000' stroke-width='2' d='M-6-25H6m-12 3H6m-12 3H6'/%3e%3cuse xlink:href='%23a' y='44'/%3e%3c/g%3e%3cpath stroke='%23fff' d='M0 17v10'/%3e%3ccircle r='12' fill='%23cd2e3a'/%3e%3cpath fill='%230047a0' d='M0-12A6 6 0 0 0 0 0a6 6 0 0 1 0 12 12 12 0 0 1 0-24z'/%3e%3c/g%3e%3cg transform='rotate(-123.69)'%3e%3cuse xlink:href='%23b'/%3e%3cpath stroke='%23fff' d='M0-23.5v3M0 17v3.5m0 3v3'/%3e%3c/g%3e%3c/svg%3e)