Abstract Studies in Social Neuroeconomics have consistently reported activation in social cognition regions during interactive economic games suggesting mentalizing during economic choice. It remains important to test the involvement of neural activity associated with mentalizing in an economic games context within the same sample of participants performing the same task. We designed a novel version of the classic false-belief task in which participants observed interactions between agents in the ultimatum and trust games and were subsequently asked to infer the agents’ beliefs. We compared activation patterns during the economic-games false-belief task to those during the classic false-belief task using conjunction analyses. We find significant overlap in left TPJ, and dmPFC, as well as temporal pole during two task phases: belief formation and belief inference. Moreover, gPPI analyses show that during belief formation right TPJ is a target of both left TPJ and right temporal pole (TP) seed regions, while during belief inferences all seed regions show interconnectivity with each other. These results indicate that across different task types and phases, mentalizing is associated with activation and connectivity across central nodes of the social cognition network. Importantly, this is the case in the context of the novel economic-games and classic false-belief tasks.
Abstract Prior studies in Social Neuroeconomics have consistently reported activation in social cognition regions during interactive economic games, suggesting mentalizing during economic choice. Such mentalizing occurs during active participation in the game, as well as during passive observation of others’ interactions. We designed a novel version of the classic false-belief task (FBT) in which participants read vignettes about interactions between agents in the ultimatum and trust games and were subsequently asked to infer the agents’ beliefs. We compared activation patterns during the economic games FBT to those during the classic FBT using conjunction analyses. We find significant overlap in the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, as well as the temporal pole (TP) during two task phases: belief formation and belief inference. Moreover, generalized Psychophysiological Interaction (gPPI) analyses show that during belief formation, the right TPJ is a target of both the left TPJ and the right TP seed regions, whereas during belief inferences all seed regions show interconnectivity with each other. These results indicate that across different task types and phases, mentalizing is associated with activation and connectivity across central nodes of the social cognition network. Importantly, this is the case for both the novel economic games and the classic FBTs.
Abstract While the effects of anxiety on various cognitive processes, including memory, attention, and learning, have been relatively well documented, the neurobiological effects of anxiety on social cognitive processes remain largely unknown. We address this gap using threat-of-shock to induce incidental anxiety while participants performed two false-belief tasks, a standard and an economic-games version. During belief formation and belief inferences, regions in a canonical social cognition network showed activation reflecting mentalizing, including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), precuneus, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). At the same time, we found threat-related suppression of social cognition regions during belief inferences. A conjunction analysis confirmed that a network of regions was simultaneously engaged during mentalizing and suppressed by anxiety: bilateral TPJ, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and putamen. We examined how threat impacted the connectivity between these seed regions and its targets. During belief formation, we found that threat suppressed the connectivity between the precuneus and two key mentalizing nodes, the dmPFC and right TPJ. Moreover, during belief inferences, threat specifically suppressed belief-based connectivity between putamen and its targets in intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and dlPFC. Dispositional distress significantly modulated threat-related suppression of connectivity between the left TPJ and left IPS. Our results indicate that social cognitive processes rely on support from other large-scale networks, such as the reward and attentional systems, and that these network interactions are disrupted under incidental and dispositional anxiety.
We review research investigating the influences of affective states on trust. To delineate the behavioral and neural effects of emotions on trust decisions, we consider research from Economics, Psychology and Neuroeconomics. We focus on behavioral and neural research that examined the impact of moods and emotions experienced at the moment of choice, and critically examine evidence concerning both positive and negative incidental and integral emotions. Overall, a pattern emerges from previous findings that strongly suggests that both incidental and integral emotions can influence decisions to trust. Specifically, positive incidental emotions, such as happiness, can enhance trust while negative incidental emotions, such as anxiety, reduce trust. At the same time, neuroimaging findings suggest that this behavioral effect is paralleled by emotions having specific effects on decision-relevant neural circuitry. Emotions alter activity during trust decisions in the temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, which have been implicated in theory of mind, as well as the anterior insula, which is commonly implicated in anticipatory negative affect. We conclude by pointing at important avenues of research regarding the role of emotions in learning to trust from past experiences, as well as the chronic distortions of affect and social behavior commonly observed in psychopathology.
It is widely hypothesized that anxiety and worry about an uncertain future lead to the adoption of comforting beliefs or "wishful thinking". However, there is little direct causal evidence for this effect. In our experiment, participants perform a visual pattern recognition task where some patterns may result in the delivery of an electric shock, a proven way of inducing anxiety. Participants engage in significant wishful thinking, as they are less likely to correctly identify patterns that they know may lead to a shock. Greater ambiguity of the pattern facilitates wishful thinking. Raising incentives for accuracy does not significantly decrease it.
Abstract While the effects of anxiety on various cognitive processes, including memory, attention, and learning, have been relatively well documented, the neurobiological effects of anxiety on social cognitive processes remain largely unknown. We address this gap using threat-of-shock to induce incidental anxiety while participants performed two false-belief tasks, a standard and an economic-games version. During belief formation and belief inferences, regions in a canonical social cognition network showed activation reflecting mentalizing, including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), precuneus, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). At the same time, we found threat-related suppression of social cognition regions during belief inferences. A conjunction analysis confirmed that a network of regions was simultaneously engaged during mentalizing and suppressed by anxiety: bilateral TPJ, bilateral IFG, and putamen. We examined how threat impacted the connectivity between seed regions from the conjunction analyses and its targets. During belief formation, we found that anxiety suppressed the connectivity between the precuneus seed and two key mentalizing nodes, the dmPFC and right TPJ. Moreover, during belief inferences threat specificallty suppressed belief-based connectivity between putamen and its targets in IPS and dlPFC, and dispositional distress significantly modulated threat-related suppression of connectivity between the left TPJ seed and left IPS. Our results highlight important effects of incidental and dispositional anxiety on specific nodes of the social cognition network. Taken together, our study uncovers novel interactions between the reward, social cognition, and attentional systems, indicating that social cognitive processes rely on support from other large-scale networks, and that these network interactions are disrupted under incidental anxiety.
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