Accelerated proteolysis of muscle is characteristic in patients with trauma or sepsis, but its cause is not well understood. Using rat muscle in vitro, we developed a bioassay to compare the proteolytic activity of plasma from 50 patients with trauma or sepsis with that of plasma from 14 normal volunteers and from 15 patients who had undergone "clean" elective surgical procedures. The mean proteolytic activity in the plasma of patients with trauma or sepsis was found to be 190 +/- 8.0 per cent of the control value (rat muscle incubated in medium alone), whereas the activity in normal plasma was 124 +/- 4.5 per cent (P less than 0.001). The activity in the plasma of patients who had undergone elective surgery was slightly elevated at 142 +/- 2.5 per cent (P less than 0.005). In 25 of the patients with trauma or sepsis the rate of amino acid release from one leg was measured by subtracting the concentration of tyrosine plus phenylalanine in the femoral artery plasma from that in the femoral vein; this rate correlated well with the bioactivity of the plasma in the bioassay system (r = 0.67, P less than 0.001). By means of ultrafiltration and chromatography, the plasma factor inducing proteolysis was isolated and found to be a peptide, probably containing sialic acid, with a chain of 33 amino acids and a molecular weight of approximately 4274 daltons.
Trichloroacetic acid extracts of plasma were fractionated on a CG-50 resin column and the 50% acetic acid eluents chromatographed on silicic acid-impregnated glass paper in butanol-acetic acid-water. The specific arginine vasopressin (AVP) zone was eluted and assayed for antidiuretic activity in the diuretic rat. Thioglycolate inactivation was used to confirm AVP activity. Recovery of as little as 4 muU AVP per ml plasma ranged between 80 and 90%. In normal subjects after an overnight fast, plasma AVP ranged between 2.5 and 10.0 muU per ml. AVP secretion was inhibited by hemodilution and stimulated with nicotine and hypertonic saline. Plasma AVP was absent in patients with diabetes insipidus even after neurohypophyseal stimulation. Plasma AVP was abnormally elevated during mild dehydration and remained above the normal range despite hemodilution in patients with untreated adrenocortical insufficiency demonstrating a delayed water diuresis. Glucosteroid therapy lowered plasma AVP to normal in dehydrated patients. A normal diuretic response to hydration was accompanied by a fall in plasma AVP to zero in steroid-treated patients. These findings suggest that hypersecretion of AVP may play an important role in the abnormal water metabolism of adrenocortical insufficiency and that the glucosteroids promote normal water diuresis by inhibiting the secretion of AVP from the neurohypophysis.
Within the last decade there has been a concerted effort from a number of sources to control the pervasive and persistent problem of corruption among the international business community. Corruption undermines democracy and development, fundamentally distorts public policy, discourages investment, leads to the misallocation of resources, discriminates against the poor, and destroys public confidence in democratic government. Despite the enhanced global awareness of the corrosive effects of corruption within the political, economic, and social spheres, there are as yet no clear, definitive indications that the occurrence of corruption has been reduced. A recent Gallup poll commissioned by Transparency International (TI) found that thirty-three percent of the 779 multinational executives surveyed believe that the problem of corruption in the business world is worsening. Commenting on the Gallup Poll survey, TI’s Chairman, Peter Eigen, said “[t]he data provides a disturbing picture of the degree to which leading exporting countries are perceived to be using corrupt practices.” In a statement made in 1999, David Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, noted that “there is a huge amount of money at stake. Just last year, there have been allegations of foreign bribery in 55 contracts worth $37 billion.” Subsequent to the initial passage, in 1977, of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) there have been several significant developments, such as the adoption of the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) and the inception of active non-governmental organizations like Transparency International (TI). Despite these developments, current evidence of extensive business corruption shows that critical gaps still remain in the mechanisms used to fight corruption. Closing these gaps will require the heightened awareness of and increased cooperation among diverse entities. First, there must be a means to establish leverage over the public sector procurement process. Second, cultural attitudes toward corruption must be modified. Other necessary strategic components are grassroots initiatives within developing nations, which are the homes of many of the bribe-takers, to mobilize civil society and the private sector. Cooperation among all involved entities - government officials, legislatures, multilateral development institutions, industry, trade unions, and civil society in both developing and industrialized nations - will be necessary to eliminate global business corruption. In this paper the authors (1) discuss why the emerging global economy creates an environment that requires integrity in the marketplace; (2) demonstrate the inability of purely legislative measures to eradicate corruption; (3) summarize the nature and costs, both social and economic, of business corruption; (4) describe current anti-corruption initiatives by the industrialized nations; (5) review grassroots initiatives to combat corruption by non-governmental organizations; (6) analyze the role of multilateral development banks in tying aid to meeting anti-corruption requirements; (7) evaluate current anti-corruption agendas emanating from developing countries; and (8) recommend a strategy to unite the diverse entities necessary to a successful campaign against corruption. This article focuses primarly on business entities within industrialized countries who bribe government officials in developing nations, but corrupt acts also occur between business entities in industrialized countries and government officials in developed nations. However, corruption is not as common between companies in developing nations and the government officials in developed countries, presumably because their current economic relationship does not provide the opportunity.
In the last decade, there has been increased global, domestic and media focus on the economic, political, and social costs associated with corruption, such as the prevalent business practice of bribing foreign public officials in order to obtain lucrative contracts, with the resulting need of the bribe recipient to launder the illicit proceeds. This increased focus on corruption can be attributed to factors such as the end of the Cold War, the further integration of Europe, the increase in international business mergers, the borderless global market and a greater recognition of the economic costs of corruption. One of the most significant economic costs of corruption results from money laundering. Money laundering occurs when secret deposits of illicit funds move through a series of deceptive transactions designed to disguise the source of the funds and make them reappear in the market in a legitimate form, without a trace of their origin. As an integral part of numerous forms of business corruption, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism and other illegal activities, the consequences of money laundering have a notable economic impact. With one estimate as to the annual global amount of money laundered calculated in a range between $500 billion and $1 trillion and an estimate that such laundered funds are equal to approximately 2 percent to 5 percent of the worlds' gross domestic product, it is obvious that decisive action needs to be taken to halt this flow of illegal funds. This is a uniquely opportune time for anti-money laundering initiatives and policy reform to occur. Since the terrorist attack in the U.S. in September, 2001, security agencies throughout the world have rushed to follow leads that may prove that Osama bin Laden financed the attack with massive amounts of money that was laundered to hide the source through a variety of schemes. Greater awareness of the harmful effects of money laundering, and public and governmental concerns regarding reverse-money laundering by terrorists, has resulted in a surge of attention directed toward anti-money laundering efforts. Consequently, financial institutions are under increasing pressure to comply with existing anti-money laundering regulations by implementing internal anti-money laundering guidelines. Governments also are experiencing significant public pressure to enhance and expand the anti-money laundering legislative framework. To determine the future direction for effective anti-money laundering initiatives, it is important to first examine the multiple challenges faced by government and other organizations and institutions trying to eradicate money laundering. These challenges include, inter alia, private banks, correspondent banks, unregulated financial services and various banking practices traditionally shrouded in secrecy. In order to assess these challenges it is necessary to evaluate the existing money laundering initiatives to determine if they sufficiently resolve the challenges relevant to the eradication of money laundering. The initiatives evaluated by the authors include those from the U.S., European Union (EU), Council of Europe (COE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), Transparency International (TI), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). In this paper the authors will: 1) delineate the insidious role of money laundering in business corruption, 2) identify the challenges to the eradication of money laundering, 3) summarize the adopted and proposed initiatives taken by the U.S., EU, COE, and a number of multilateral and non-governmental entities, 4) analyze the feasibility and effectiveness of the current adopted and proposed domestic, European, and multilateral initiatives in addressing those challenges identified, and 5) make recommendations regarding future money laundering policies.
It has been argued that hedge funds were among the contributors to the fiscal crisis that arose from the securitization of subprime loans. The hedge fund industry, however, did not play a direct precipitating role in the events leading to the financial meltdown. Indeed, there is no one identifiable primary culprit because the crisis arose from a series of inter-related factors fueled, in part, by the deregulated environment in which financial institutions were operating. However, it is certainly a subject of great debate whether the structure and financial strength of the huge hedge fund industry, with approximately 10,000 funds and $2 trillion in assets in 2007, exacerbated the intensity of the meltdown 1) by being ready, willing, and able buyers for the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) arising out of the mortgage-backed securities, 2) by contributing to the volatility of the market with stock sales to provide the massive amounts of cash required for investor redemptions and to meet margin calls, and 3) by investing in the toxic credit default swaps (CDSs) market.
In the 1970s, Congress reacted to the financial wrongdoing of Lockheed Corp. and others by enacting SEC 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which (1) requires corporations to keep records that accurately reflect financial transactions and (2) mandates a system of internal accounting controls. Going a step further in 2002, Congress responded to the Enron scandal by imposing personal accountability on chief executive officers in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA). After recounting responses prior to the existence of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to corporate abuses and the historical background of the SEC's requirements for corporate financial reporting and disclosure, the Authors examine whether lessons can be drawn from the FCPA experience regarding the deterrent effect of the SOA's corresponding provisions against fraudulent and unethical behavior.
