The main aim of this paper is to study the extent to which the project based organization (PBO) and the latent organization determine the actual behavior of actors in a project based industry and how this is mediated by the types of contracts and rewarding practices these organizational forms allow. Labor contracts connected to the PBO are mostly transactional in nature, while the members of the latent organization are linked by relational contracts. Interviews with Dutch film producers show that the transactional contracts connected to the PBO are less important than the relational contracts connected to the latent organization in governing the actual behavior of the involved actors. Relational contracts that structure relationships in the latent organization allow flexible rewarding practices, just like in ‘normal’ organizations. In turn, employees prove willing to assist the organization in handling environmental uncertainty by making resources available without insisting on immediate compensation.
In this paper, we study signals and sequences of signals emitted by high status third party sources that were received at the start of a producer’s competitive activity. Distinguishing between sources with a financial stake in transmitting signals about a producer and those without a financial stake, we explore the extent to which signals and sequences of signals from sources with different stakes affect overall sales performance. We find that signals from high status third party sources that do not have a financial stake in the success of a producer have a positive effect on sales. Whereas signals from high status third party sources that do have a financial stake in the new producer affect performance negatively, unless they are part of a sequence, and succeeded by a signal from a source that does not have a financial stake.
Although entrepreneurship scholars argue that mentoring programs are a crucial element of startup incubators and accelerators, less clarity exists about the process by which startup mentoring actually adds value. Drawing from social exchange theory and organizational life cycle theory, we conceptualize startup mentoring as a novel form of mentoring, classify different types of startup mentors such as experienced entrepreneurs, investors, and industry or functional experts, and identify the potential costs and benefits involved for both the mentee and mentor throughout the startup’s development process. Our novel conceptualization and process model of startup mentoring informs a broad range of conceptual issues relevant for entrepreneurship scholars, including the matching process between mentors and mentees, the evolution of mentor-entrepreneur relationships, and the potential impact of startup mentorship on entrepreneurial outcomes.
Previous studies focus on founder reputation to explain investments in project-based ventures (PBVs) and the PBV’s future performance. In this study, we focus on the resource commitment and dual role of intermediaries both as “selector” and “partner” of PBVs. First, as selector, we hypothesize that the intermediary’s commitment can positively moderate the effect of its own reputation as well as the PBV founder’s reputation on attracting investments. Second, as partner, we hypothesize that the intermediary’s commitment mediates the effect of the PBV founder's reputation on the PBV's eventual performance. Finally, we hypothesize that past collaboration between the intermediary and the PBV founder positively moderates the relation between PBV founder’s reputation and PBV performance. We conduct our quantitative study in the empirical context of the film industry with film productions as PBVs, film producers as PBV founders, film distributors as intermediaries between the producer and its investors, and intermediaries between the film and its audience. Intermediary’s commitment is measured as the number of opening screens during the film release. We find support for all our hypotheses, except for the moderation effect of the intermediary’s commitment on the relationship between the intermediary's reputation and investments in the PBV.
Project-based organizations in the film industry usually have a dual-leadership structure, based on a division of tasks between the dual leaders – the director and the producer – in which the former is predominantly responsible for the artistic and the latter for the commercial aspects of the film. These organizations also have a role hierarchically below and between the dual leaders: the 1st assistant director. This organizational constellation is likely to lead to role conflict and role ambiguity experienced by the person occupying that particular role. Although prior studies found negative effects of role conflict and role ambiguity, this study shows they can also have beneficial effects because they create space for defining the role expansively that, in turn, can be facilitated by the dual leaders defining their own roles more narrowly. In a more general sense, this study also shows the usefulness of analyzing the antecedents and consequences of roles, role definition, and role crafting in connection to the behavior of occupants of adjacent roles.
Entrepreneurial passion is contagious such that social interaction leads to passion convergence. However, do entrepreneurs also select whom they interact with based on passion similarity? The complex interdependencies between social networks and passion remain undertheorized and empirically puzzling. Using a stochastic actor-oriented model (SIENA) and four waves of panel data, we test hypotheses about the co-evolution of social networks and entrepreneurial passion during a 5-months university-based acceleration program. We find that entrepreneurs select social network ties based on similar levels of passion for founding and inventing but that only passion for founding is socially contagious. We discuss theoretical, empirical, and practical implications.
Abstract Film production often takes place in project-based organizations (PBOs). Although each of these PBOs ceases to exist as soon as the film is finished, the professionals involved in a project are likely to collaborate with the same people in series of such projects and together form what is described as a latent organization. The two core roles in each project are those of the director and producer, who function as dual leaders, the former being responsible for the business side and the latter for the artistic side. Precisely because the individuals fulfilling these two roles are at different sides of the faultline, the link between them bridges it and the strength of this link is a prime determinant of the success of the PBO and the latent organization. This chapter studies the relations between producers and directors, the division of labor between them and, especially, the extent to which each of them is involved in the selection of other members of the organization.
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