The influenza virus is the most frequent cause of acute respiratory illness requiring medical intervention, affecting individuals from all age groups. The viral subtype A(H3N2) has been dominant in most seasonal influenza epidemics since 1968. Previous research suggests that the evolutionary dynamics of influenza A(H3N2) is characterised by a complex interaction between the high viral mutation rate, gene rearrangements, selection exerted by the immune system and the migration flow of populations within and between different regions of the world. In Brazil, knowledge of influenza virus epidemiology and evolution is still incipient. Thus, our objective was to investigate the evolution of influenza A(H3N2) in Brazil in order to verify the role of the country in the global spread of the virus, to reconstruct the profile of viral migration in different regions of Brazil and check the compatibility between the vaccine and the virus strains circulating in the country during the period of this study. Sequences of the HA1 portion of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene from strains collected in the Northeast, Southeast and South of Brazil between 1999 to 2012, were compared with sequences of vaccine strains and sequences from other geographical regions and subjected to genetic distance, evolutionary and phylogeographic analyses. Our analysis showed that the vaccine composition was not the most suitable for seven of the 14 years evaluated and that a few mutations in amino acid residues located in the antigenic sites of HA are able to give rise to new variants in a relatively short period of time. The evolution rate of the HA1 portion of the HA gene of influenza A(H3N2) was estimated at 5.1 x10-3 subst./site/year. The phylogenetic and phylogeographic analysis of influenza A(H3N2) showed a strong temporal structure and a minor, however significant geographical structure. The reconstruction of the worldwide dissemination dynamic of influenza A(H3N2) allows us to verify that Brazil has a marginal role in the emergence and dissemination of new viral variants at a global scale. Brazil was tightly connected to other American countries and the major entrance of influenza A(H3N2) in Brazil seems to be by the Southeast region. Within Brazil, the major flux of transmission appears to be from the Southeast to the South and to a less extent from the South to the Northeast.
As infecções do trato respiratório estão entre os três principais problemas de saúde pública que atingem a infância, acompanhadas das doenças diarreicas e da desnutrição infantil.Além das crianças, a população de risco é formada por imunocomprometidos
Abstract Background The International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), requires that States Parties develop their capacities to detect, assess, and respond to public health threats and report to the World Health Assembly through the States Parties Annual Report (SPAR). The National Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plans (PPRP) contribute to countries capacities however there are some discrepancies between both tools. To identify gaps and define priority actions to strengthen pandemic plans, we assessed the concordance between national pandemic preparedness and response plans for respiratory pathogens against the pandemic checklist published in 2023 and the SPAR. Methods In this retrospective, semi-quantitative study, conducted in August 2024, we reviewed the most recent respiratory pandemic plans for 35 PAHO member states and assessed their concordance with (1) actionable guidelines in the World Health Organization pandemic checklist and (2) IHR (2005) core capacities using the latest SPAR tool. We developed 25 tracking questions to identify gaps, strengths, and opportunities for improvement in the pandemic plans, using the pandemic checklist built on the capacities and capabilities described in the WHO’s Preparedness and Resilience for Emerging Threats (PRET) Module 1. We used a five-point scale (from 1, when the subcomponent was not mentioned, to 5, when the subcomponent was described at all levels), and we calculated the average pandemic plans score (PP score) for each component. Data from pandemic plans (2005–2024) were compiled, selected, analyzed, and scored. We compared the average SPAR score and the PP score to assess areas of convergence and variance between preparedness and capacities. The analysis was carried out using R and Excel. Results We analyzed 35 respiratory pandemic plans: 29 were influenza-specific, five were COVID-19-specific, and one was not pathogen-specific. Most current national plans showed limited alignment with the content recommended in the PRET pandemic checklist. At regional level, the lowest concordance between plans and pandemic checklist was in the following subcomponents Public Health and Social Measures (80% of the plans had a score of 1); Emergency, Logistics and Supply Chain Management (74%); and Research and Development (71%). Conversely, the strongest subcomponents (≥40% of plans with a score of 4 or 5) were: Policy, Legal, and Normative Instruments (45%); Coordination (46%); and Surveillance: early detection and assessment (43%). In most countries, the SPAR scores tended to be higher than PP scores, except for Argentina (the newest plan reviewed) for which the pattern was reversed, and the PP scores exceeded the SPAR scores. Conclusion Given the gaps identified between current plans and the global standards espoused by the PRET Module 1 initiative, it is recommended that countries build on the strengths of their national pandemic preparedness and response plans and update them using PRET module 1. This will support countries advance the capacities required by the IHR.
Abstract Genomic sequencing is essential to track the evolution and spread of SARS-CoV-2, optimize molecular tests, treatments, vaccines, and guide public health responses. To investigate the global SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance, we used sequences shared via GISAID to estimate the impact of sequencing intensity and turnaround times on variant detection in 189 countries. In the first two years of the pandemic, 78% of high-income countries sequenced >0.5% of their COVID-19 cases, while 42% of low- and middle-income countries reached that mark. Around 25% of the genomes from high income countries were submitted within 21 days, a pattern observed in 5% of the genomes from low- and middle-income countries. We found that sequencing around 0.5% of the cases, with a turnaround time <21 days, could provide a benchmark for SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance. Socioeconomic inequalities undermine the global pandemic preparedness, and efforts must be made to support low- and middle-income countries improve their local sequencing capacity.