To study the temporal dynamics and capacity-limits of attentional selection and encoding researchers often employ the attentional blink (AB) phenomenon: Subjects’ impaired ability to report the second of two targets in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream they appear within 200-500ms of one another. The AB has now been the subject of hundreds of scientific investigations and a variety of different dual-target RSVP paradigms have been employed to study this failure of consciousness. The three most common are those where targets are defined categorically from distractors (e.g., report the letter targets that appear amongst digit distractors), those where target definition is based on featural information (e.g., report the red coloured targets that appear amongst the black distractors) and those where there is a set switch between T1 and T2 with the first target typically being featurally defined and T2 requiring a detection or discrimination judgement based on identity or category membership (probe task). An almost universally held assumption across all AB theories is that these three types of task measure the same deficit. Here, across two experiments using large samples and an individual differences approach, we tested this assumption. Subjects performed a variety of AB tasks and all were reliable (test-retest. However, while the ABs found in tasks without a T1-T2 set switch (e.g., featural and categorical AB tasks) and those with a T1-T2 set switch correlated with one another, no relationship in AB magnitude was observed between the these two groups of tasks. Thus, AB paradigms with and without T1-T2 set switches appear to reflect distinct cognitive limitations, suggesting that there are multiple bottlenecks in human information processing that limit temporal attention. Meeting abstract presented at VSS 2012
Noninvasive brain stimulation techniques, such as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), show promise in treating a range of psychiatric and neurologic conditions. However, optimization of such applications requires a better understanding of how tDCS alters cognition and behavior. Existing evidence implicates dopamine in tDCS alterations of brain activity and plasticity; however, there is as yet no causal evidence for a role of dopamine in tDCS effects on cognition and behavior. Here, in a preregistered, double-blinded study, we examined how pharmacologically manipulating dopamine altered the effect of tDCS on the speed-accuracy trade-off, which taps ubiquitous strategic operations. Cathodal tDCS was delivered over the left prefrontal cortex and the superior medial frontal cortex before participants (
Decades of research on visual perception has uncovered many phenomena, such as binocular rivalry, backward masking, and the attentional blink, that reflect ‘failures of consciousness’. Although stimuli do not reach awareness in these paradigms, there is evidence that they nevertheless undergo semantic processing. Object substitution masking (OSM), however, appears to be the exception to this rule. In OSM, a temporally-trailing four-dot mask interferes with target perception, even though it has different contours from and does not spatially overlap with the target. Previous research suggests that OSM has an early locus, blocking the extraction of semantic information. Here, we refute this claim, showing implicit semantic perception in OSM using a target-mask priming paradigm. Across two experiments, we manipulated the semantic congruency between target words and the color of the mask, and observers made a speeded identification response to the mask color, followed by a target identification (Experiment 1) or detection judgement (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we obtained a strong, systematic effect of the semantic congruency of the target word on response time to the mask (priming), such that responses were faster for compatible compared with incompatible target-mask trials. This was the case both when observers correctly identified the target, and, critically, when they did not. In Experiment 2, we also obtained a priming effect both when the target was correctly detected, and when it was missed. Strikingly, however, a pattern of negative priming was observed (faster responses to compatible trials) when the target was missed, whereas the opposite pattern was found when the target was detected. This result converges with previous findings that unconscious and conscious processing can lead qualitatively different patterns of priming. Most importantly, the significant effect of semantic congruency from masked targets in both experiments reveals that semantic information suppressed via OSM can nevertheless guide behavior.
The encoding of information from one event into working memory can delay high-level, central decision-making processes for subsequent events [e.g., Jolicoeur, P., & Dell'Acqua, R. The demonstration of short-term consolidation. Cognitive Psychology, 36, 138-202, 1998, doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0684]. Working memory, however, is also believed to interfere with the deployment of top-down attention [de Fockert, J. W., Rees, G., Frith, C. D., & Lavie, N. The role of working memory in visual selective attention. Science, 291, 1803-1806, 2001, doi:10.1126/science.1056496]. It is, therefore, possible that, in addition to delaying central processes, the engagement of working memory encoding (WME) also postpones perceptual processing as well. Here, we tested this hypothesis with time-resolved fMRI by assessing whether WME serially postpones the action of top-down attention on low-level sensory signals. In three experiments, participants viewed a skeletal rapid serial visual presentation sequence that contained two target items (T1 and T2) separated by either a short (550 msec) or long (1450 msec) SOA. During single-target runs, participants attended and responded only to T1, whereas in dual-target runs, participants attended and responded to both targets. To determine whether T1 processing delayed top-down attentional enhancement of T2, we examined T2 BOLD response in visual cortex by subtracting the single-task waveforms from the dual-task waveforms for each SOA. When the WME demands of T1 were high (Experiments 1 and 3), T2 BOLD response was delayed at the short SOA relative to the long SOA. This was not the case when T1 encoding demands were low (Experiment 2). We conclude that encoding of a stimulus into working memory delays the deployment of attention to subsequent target representations in visual cortex.
Performing two tasks concurrently typically leads to performance costs. Historically, multitasking costs have been assumed to reflect fundamental constraints of cognitive architectures. A new perspective proposes that multitasking costs reflect information sharing between constituent tasks; shared information gains representational efficiency, at the expense of multitasking capability. We test this theory by determining whether increasing cross-task information harms multitasking. 48 participants performed multitasks where they mapped keypresses to four shapes. In a subsequent statistical learning task, these shapes then formed pairs that were predictive or non-predictive of an upcoming target judgement. When participants again responded to these shapes in the multitasking context, performance was poorer when the shape pair had been predictive of target outcomes in the learning phase, relative to non-predictive. Thus, associating common information to shape pairings transferred to negatively impact multitasking performance, providing the first causal evidence for the shared representational account of multitasking performance.
Although animal research implicates a central role for dopamine in motor skill learning, a direct causal link has yet to be established in neurotypical humans. Here, we tested if a pharmacological manipulation of dopamine alters motor learning, using a paradigm which engaged explicit, goal-directed strategies. Participants (27 females; 11 males; aged 18–29 years) first consumed either 100 mg of levodopa ( n = 19), a dopamine precursor that increases dopamine availability, or placebo ( n = 19). Then, during training, participants learnt the explicit strategy of aiming away from presented targets by instructed angles of varying sizes. Targets jumped mid-movement by the instructed aiming angle. Task success was thus contingent upon aiming accuracy and not speed. The effect of the dopamine manipulations on skill learning was assessed during training and after an overnight follow-up. Increasing dopamine availability at training improved aiming accuracy and lengthened reaction times, particularly for larger, more difficult aiming angles, both at training and, importantly, at follow-up, despite prominent session-by-session performance improvements in both accuracy and speed. Exogenous dopamine thus seems to result in a learnt, persistent propensity to better adhere to task goals. Results support the proposal that dopamine is important in engagement of instrumental motivation to optimize adherence to task goals, particularly when learning to execute goal-directed strategies in motor skill learning.
Skilled motor performance is essential for survival. Indeed, we often not only choose to learn motor skills because of some external reward, but also because skilled movement, in and of itself, is satisfying. While dopamine is known to drive reward-based motor learning, it remains unclear whether dopamine is implicated in motor learning under conditions ostensibly driven by intrinsic rewards/motivation (i.e., in the absence of extrinsic feedback or reward). Here, we investigated the role of dopamine in motor skill learning guided by internally determined signals of performance success, using a task where learning occurred either in the absence or presence of feedback. We found that dopamine altered performance both in the presence and in the absence of information on task success. This provides direct causal evidence for a role of dopamine in motor learning driven by internal task goals.