Pendant l'automne de 1795 quelques ecclesiastiques constitutionnels se reunirent a paris pour organiser le retablissement du culte en france. L'idee elle-meme semble avoir ete concue en premier lieu par l'abbe clement, mais il fut encourage par le medecin charles saillant. L'abbe gregoire se joignit au groupe en decembre et peu apres prononca un discours ou il revendiqua la liberte des cultes. Cette liberte fut accordee de mauvaise grace par la convention nationale et les eveques reunis redigerent une premiere lettre encyclique en mars ou ils etablirent certains reglements pour l'organisation de la nouvelle eglise constitutionnelle. Pendant les mois suivants quelques eglises a paris furent reouvertes. Naturellement les constitutionnels devaient faire face a l' hostilite des pretres insermentes qui profiterent des memes lois pour s'installer dans d'autres paroisses de la capitale. Malgre les difficultes, des presbyteres furent etablis a paris et a versailles, mais la tentative d'elire un eveque de versailles echoua. Sous le directoire, l'eglise s'affronta a la meme hostilite anticlericale qu'auparavant, mais la situation s'ameliora apres la nomination de cochon au ministere de la police en avril 1796. Une seconde lettre encyclique, publiee en decembre 1795, encouragea l'organisation de la nouvelle eglise, mais les relations avec le pape resterent mauvaises. Par l'organe d'un journal hebdomadaire les eveques reunis reussirent a diffuser leurs idees. Clement fut enfin elu eveque de versailles en fevrier 1797, mais l'eglise de paris resta sans eveque. Pierre thuin, eveque de meaux, se rallia en 1796 a la cause constitutionnelle et aida a preparer le premier concile national en aout 1797. Ce concile etait le fruit des efforts d'un groupe de chretiens, animes par des sentiments gallicans mais pousses aussi par la conviction que leur foi devait s'exterioriser pleinement dans une societe republicaine.
Documentation is provided in this report for the closeout of IE Bulletin 79-23 regarding the potential failure of emergency diesel generator field exciter transformers. Closeout is based upon the implementation and verification of three actions required by the bulletin. Evaluation of utility responses and NRC/Region inspection reports indicates that the bulletin is closed for all of the 119 nuclear power facilities with an operating license or a construction permit at the time the bulletin was issued, September 12, 1979. Deviations from bulletin testing requirements, along with licensee justifications, are listed. It is concluded that the problem of concern was not generic, since only two plants, Nine Mile Point 1 and Turkey Point, required modifications to correct connections which could cause high circulating currents. The problem at Turkey Point is described in the bulletin (see page A-1). Background information is supplied in the Introduction and Appendix A.
Documentation is provided in this report for the closeout of IE Bulletin 80-15 for nuclear power reactors. This bulletin pertained to a possible loss of the Emergency Notification System (ENS) upon loss of offsite power. Closeout is based on the implementation and verification of six (6) required actions by licensees of nuclear power reactors in operation or near to receiving an operating license when the bulletin was issued on June 18, 1980. Evaluation of utility responses and NRC/Region inspection reports indicates that the bulletin is closed for all of the 69 nuclear power reactors to which it was issued for action and which were not shut down indefinitely or permanently at the time of issuance of this report. Background information is supplied in the Introduction and Appendix A. Nuclear fuel facilities as well as nuclear power facilities were identified in the enclosures to the bulletin. However, per an NRC memorandum, the closeout of the bulletin for nuclear fuel facilities is not within the scope of this report.
On June 18, 1980, Commonwealth Edison Company submitted Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-295/80-24 to the NRC, describing a malfunction of a Westinghouse Type W-2 control switch important to safety at Zion Unit 1. On the same date, Westinghouse submitted a preliminary issue of Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-80-9 to the NRC on the subject switches. On July 31, 1980, IE Bulletin 80-20 was issued to all power plant licensees and permit holders, requiring them to take specific actions and report results. Evaluation of utility responses and NRC/IE inspection reports shows that the bulletin can be closed out per specific criteria for 122 (98%) of the 124 current facilities to which it was issued. A followup item for the remaining two facilities is proposed for use by NRC/IE, to ensure satisfactory completion of corrective action.
On April 19, 1980, decay heat removal (DHR) capability was lost at Davis-Besse 1 for approximately two and one-half hours in a refueling mode. Typically for that mode, many systems and components were out of service for maintanance and testing or were deactivated to preclude inadvertent actuation. IE Bulletin 80-12 was issued May 9, 1980 for action by licensees of operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs); it was issued for information to nuclear power facilities other than operating PWRs. The intent of the bulletin ws to improve nuclear plant safety by reducing the likelihood of losing DHR capability in PWRs, especially when some DHR components are unavailable because of maintenance activities during refueling and cold shutdown modes of operation. A related NRR Generic Letter was issued June 11, 1980 to licensees of operating PWRs, requesting amendment of technical specifications to ensure long-term maintenance of DHR capability. Evaluation of utility responses and NRC/IE inspection reports indicates that the bulletin can be closed out per specific criteria for 33 (75%) of the 44 affected facilities.
During shutdown of San Onofre units 2 and 3 on March 3 and 8, 1983, four General Electric (GE) Type AK-2 circuit breakers in the reactor protection systems (RPSs) failed to open on activation of the undervoltage trip coil during testing. Since issuance of IE Bulletin 79-09, April 17, 1979, on failures of GE Type AK-2 breakers, additional failures had been reported before the tests at San Onofre. Because of concern about continued failures of the subject breakers in RPSs, the NRC/IE issued IE Bulletin 83-04 on March 11, 1983. All licensees of operating pressurized water power reactors, except those with Westinghouse Type DB breakers, were required to take five specific actions. The bulletin was issued for information to all other nuclear power facilities. Evaluation of utility responses and NRC/IE inspection reports indicates that the bulletin can be closed out for all of the 50 facilities to which it was issued for action. Six plants had breakers which failed to operate satisfactorily during tests for bulletin requirements. There are no remaining areas of concern for this bulletin.
In 1978 serious manufacturing deficiencies in deep draft pumps were found in one facility. Similar deficiencies, as well as design deficiencies, were identified at about the same time in three other facilities which required pump rework and design changes, followed by extensive operational testing. These occurrences raised questions concerning this type of pump in safety-related applications where there was not sufficient pre-operational testing or operating experience to assure long term operability. IE Bulletin 79-15 was issued to alert all facilities to the potential problem, to acquire information to determine the extent of the problem, and to request corrective action in facilities where the problem was found. Review of utility responses to the Bulletin by NRC resulted in adding the evaluation of long term operability of deep draft pumps in safety-related applications to the normal licensing process for plants under construction. The operating plants where response information is judged not adequate to assure long term reliability are listed by Regions in Appendix C together with proposed followup testing to satisfactorily assure long term operability and close out the Bulletin. There are nine of these plants out of a total of 74 operating units. Bulletin status remains open for one other facilitymore » where followup of response commitments, but no pump testing for assuring long term operability, is proposed.« less
Documentation is provided in this report for the closeout of NRC Bulletin 87-01 regarding monitoring the thickness of pipe and component walls in high-energy single-phase and two-phase carbon steel piping systems of nuclear power plants. Both safety-related and non-safety-related systems are included in the monitoring program. The bulletin required five (5) actions by licensees and holders of construction permits. Complete closeout of the bulletin for 119 affected facilities and conclusions are based on Generic Letter (GL) 89-08. This GL requires written assurance that the licensing basis continues to be met by high-energy carbon steel piping systems subject to erosion/corrosion. Background information is provided in the Introduction and Appendix A.
On May 8, 1980, Westinghouse reported to the NRC/IE per Title 10 CFR Part 21 that one or more centrifugal charging pumps could be damaged by low flow at certain plants before satisfactory termination of safety injection after a secondary side high energy line rupture. The plants of concern had been notified, a calculational method of evaluation and plant-specific reviews had been recommended, and interim modifications had been proposed by Westinghouse. The NRC/IE issued IE Bulletin 80-18 on July 24, 1980 because of this potential safety-related problem. Licensees and near-term licensees of pressurized water reactors (PWRs) were required to take specific actions and submit written responses. Utilities with PWRs under construction were issued the bulletin for information, in preparation for the licensing process. Evaluation of utility responses and NRC/Region inspection reports shows that the bulletin can be closed out per specific criteria for 44 (96%) of the 46 facilities to which it was issued for action. A followup item for the remaining dual plant is proposed for use by the NRC to ensure satisfactory completion of required and corrective actions.
During an NRC inspection at Nine Mile Point 2, examination by radiography of primary containment liner penetration sleeve-to-process pipe (flued heat fitting) welds revealed rejectable defects not originally found by ultrasonic examination. Apparently, ultrasonic signals from the weld backing bar masked signals from defects. Further investigation found similar problems at Beaver Valley 2 and North Anna 3 and 4. IE Bulletin 80-08 was issued to acquire information from all facilities to determine the generic nature of the problem. It was found that, because of evolution of the ASME Nuclear Code, plants under construction designed to that Code since about 1974 are required to volumetrically examine these welds, and so, in general, do not have the problem. Operating plants, built to earlier codes not requiring such design and examination for the containment welds, present a concern for the quality of this type of weld and for the integrity of the primary containment boundary. Bulletin status is closed for all but 11 facilities. Recommendations are made for resolution of the problem for these facilities. These include meaningful radiographic examination of welds of concern, if possible, and if not, licensee justification for not making a radiographic examination.
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