Suppose, we could take a pill that would turn us into morally better people. Would we have a duty to take such a pill? In recent years, a number of philosophers have discussed this issue. Most prominently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that we would have a duty to take such a pill. In this article, I wish to investigate the possible limits of a duty to take moral enhancement drugs through investigating the related question of whether it would be desirable to create a world populated entirely with morally perfect people. I argue, drawing on the work of Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf, and Michael Slote, that we have reason to be grateful that we do not live a world in which everyone is morally perfect, as this would prevent people from dedicating their lives to valuable nonmoral projects. I then argue that this thought should serve as a limitation on attempts to morally improve people through the use of technology. Finally, I explore the implications of this discussion for some of the less ambitious forms of moral enhancement currently being explored in the literature. I argue that these forms of enhancement give us no reason to worry about preventing valuable, morally imperfect ways of life. In fact, by acting as a shortcut to moral development, they might serve as an aid to help people fulfill valuable nonmoral goals in a way that is morally permissible.
While moral philosophers have paid significant attention to the concept of moral supererogation, far less attention has been paid to the possibility that supererogation may also exist in other areas of normativity. Recently, though, philosophers have begun to consider the possible existence of prudential, epistemic, aesthetic, and sporting supererogation. These discussions tend to focus on aspects of our practices in these areas of normativity that suggest an implicit acceptance of the existence of supererogation. In this chapter, I will offer a different kind of defense of non-moral supererogation. I will begin by considering a particular kind of argument made in support of moral supererogation. According to this line of argument, we should accept the existence of moral supererogation because a moral code which makes room for supererogation is likely to be more effective at promoting morally desirable behavior than a moral code which leaves no room for the supererogatory. I will begin by outlining this argument. I will then develop a similar line of argument for prudential, epistemic, aesthetic, and sporting norms.
Abstract This chapter distinguishes emotions from related phenomena such as sensations, moods, and drives and discusses how emotional states can change. It introduce the notions of an “interest”, “ceteris paribus laws”, and Elster’s conception of mechanism to explain the role emotions can play in social scientific explanations and in normative claims. It compares and contrasts universalist and constructivist conceptions of emotions. Building on this, it introduces William Reddy’s conception of an emotional regime and how that idea relates to related notions such as “emotional labor” (Hochschild), “emotional hegemony” (Jaggar), and “emotional regulation” (Gross, Burkitt). It analyses the significance emotions have in social relationships and practices more broadly but also focuses on the specific emotions that are key to what Boltanski and Chiapello call “the new spirit of capitalism”.
Abstract This book investigates the extensive and growing economic inequalities that characterize the affluent market societies in which we currently live. It diagnoses the damaging impact that existing inequalities have on well-being and explores more just alternatives. It draws on philosophical, psychological, social scientific, and other insights to diagnose what has gone wrong in our highly unequal and frequently unhappy societies. Combining both the approaches of philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, John Rawls, and Philip Pettit and analyses from political economists, it uncovers the economic, social, and political mechanisms that create and perpetuate income and wealth inequality. The key claim is that wealthy elites engage in rent seeking and opportunity hoarding and shape our social, economic, and political structures in ways that benefit them and harm the rest. It develops important insights from the new science of happiness to assess the impact of inequality on the well-being of the poor, the middle class, and the rich. It specifically examines the role of key emotions, such as shame (amongst the poor), envy, and admiration (towards and for the rich). It discusses which emotional narratives serve to justify and entrench excessive inequalities in income and wealth. The result is an explanation of the emotional regime that characterizes our capitalist societies and that perpetuates the unfair gap between the extravagance of the rich and the misery of the poor. It concludes with policies and proposals to reshape this emotional regime in the interests of justice and solidarity.
Abstract This chapter analyses two mechanisms that play a key role in creating and perpetuating the economic inequalities in capitalist societies: positionality and opportunity hoarding. Building on the work of Fred Hirsch, it explains what positional goods are and how they factor into a drift towards oligarchy. It discusses Charles Tilly’s notion of opportunity hoarding: how the elites succeed in shaping social structures that serve their interests and their position of domination. In addition, the elites constitute a cultural avant-garde, who legislate taste and determine what exactly signals distinction and what is regarded as shameful. To reverse the increasing and devastating role played by positionality and positional competition, the chapter discusses the strategy of de-marketizing the important public goods of education and healthcare.
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