As we enter the last weeks of negotiation between Britain and the EU, things are not looking good. All the possible outcomes look both painful and expensive for the UK. How did we get here? At the root of the problem is the British government’s definition of sovereignty, claims Nicholas Westcott (SOAS).
The Colonial Office in World War II - The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy: Organisation and the Planning of a Metropolitan Initiative, 1939–1945. By J. M. Lee and Martin Petter. London: Temple Smith, for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1982. Pp. 285. £18.95. - Volume 25 Issue 1
Abstract The continuous publication over 120 years of African Affairs, originally the Journal of the African Society, provides an invaluable source for charting Britain’s shifting perceptions of and interaction with Africa. Though limited, its readership included many of those most closely involved in Britain with studying and engaging with Africa during the 20th century. The journal charts a significant change: from an initial curiosity about Africa that included Africans’ own perception of and writing about their world; through a period when imperial perspectives on how to rule and how to develop African colonies dominated; to a more academic analysis of the dynamics of independence and how independent African countries subsequently evolved; and finally to a growing engagement with African scholars themselves and African perceptions of the changes taking place on the continent. At each stage a number of themes emerge that illuminate our understanding of how Africa was seen and interpreted by the British and, latterly, by Africans.
International relations have always been profoundly affected by technology. The Internet - 20 years young - is having just such a profound impact. It constitutes, along with the IT systems it connects, a quantum leap in people's ability to communicate both one-to-one and one-to-many. Just as ocean-going sailing ships enabled the expansion of Europe in the 16th-18th centuries, the telegraph underpinned the empires of the 19th century, and the aeroplane, radio and TV have transformed international relations in the 20th century, the Internet creates a new set of opportunities and risks for the world. The main difference is that the changes will happen faster. It is still early to identify the Internet's impact on the relations between people across borders and between states. But it is necessary to try. Establishing a framework for analysing the changes - as business has done - will help governments and other international actors take strategic decisions based on reality, rather than on an outdated view of how things happen. Prediction is a poor basis for strategic planning, but a more sophisticated risk analysis of how the Internet is changing international relations will help improve strategic decisions, and indicate how to engage better with international actors to achieve the desired ends.
In December 2018 the Trump Administration announced a new Africa strategy.1 This briefing examines US President Donald Trump's personal views on Africa, which reveal his lack of interest in the continent, other than for its commercial potential; his Administration's approach to Africa, which actually demonstrates a good deal of continuity with previous US policy under presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama; and examines the new strategy, which is firmly embedded in the context of Trump's wider 'America First' foreign policy and the United States' strategic global rivalry with China and Russia. It argues that the Africa strategy is entirely consistent with the President's overall world view, and is less different from previous US Administrations' policies on Africa than may appear. But that will not make it any more successful, especially as its internal contradictions are exposed. President Trump himself does not give the impression of giving much thought to Africa, and when he does, of being anything other than dismissive about it. Of roughly 5,000 Presidential tweets since he took office, just four have mentioned Africa—two of them relating to South Africa's land laws and one to Melania Trump's visit to the continent in October 2018.2 In his most widely quoted comment on Africa, at a closed-door briefing with Congressmen in January 2018, President Trump is reported to have referred to the undesirability of receiving more immigrants from 'shithole countries' like Haiti and Africa.3 Though Trump denied these were the words he used, he did not deny the sentiment. The comment immediately provoked a storm of protest, domestically from many African Americans and internationally from across African publics and policymakers. The chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus accused the President of racism, as did the UN's human rights spokesman.4 Across Africa US Ambassadors were summoned to foreign ministries to receive protests about the defamatory phrase. Presidents tweeted their disgust, with Macky Sall of Senegal saying he was shocked and demanded that Africa and Africans be shown the 'respect and consideration' they deserved, while Cyril Ramaphosa (just elected ANC leader) called them 'hugely offensive'.5 The African Union collectively, through its mission in Washington, expressed its 'infuriation (sic), disappointment and outrage' at the comments and demanded a formal apology.6 African publics responded with more humour, tweeting photos of their particularly beautiful or developed part of the 'shithole'. Trump himself characteristically made no apology, confident that his comments played well with a voter base who shared his views. State Department officials across Africa, instructed not to deny the comments but simply listen to reactions, had no option but to report the outrage and damage to the US's image, while 78 former US Ambassadors and officials wrote to the President in protest.7