Herman Cappelen

University of Oslo

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Ernie Lepore

Rutgers Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

Josh Dever

The University of Texas at Austin

John Hawthorne

University of Southern California

Ernest Lepore

John Wiley & Sons (United States)

Jessica Brown

University of St Andrews

Douglas G. Winblad

Vassar College

David Plunkett

Dartmouth College

Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes

University of Bergen

Max Deutsch

University of Hong Kong

Nicholas Rescher

University of Pittsburgh

Cooperative Institutions

Instituto de Filosofía

University of St Andrews

University of Notre Dame

University of Oxford

Rutgers Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

John Wiley & Sons (United States)

University of Oslo

Liechtenstein Institute

Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

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Reference Without Deference

Oxford University Press eBooks (2025)

Herman Cappelen Max Deutsch

Abstract On a standard understanding of externalist metasemantic theories, such theories require a speaker to defer to other speakers in order to share content with them. We argue that this standard understanding is mistaken and that, on a proper understanding of externalism, sharing content does not depend in any way on deference, either to experts or one’s linguistic community. We defend a version of externalism that we call ‘pure externalism’, and we argue that the idea that shared content requires deference is a residue of internalism/descriptivisism to which externalists ought to be opposed. We also argue that, despite common belief to the contrary, several of the originators of externalism, including Tyler Burge, do not think that deference is in any way relevant, let alone required, for shared externalist content.

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192856852.013.33

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Context and Communication

Herman Cappelen Josh Dever

PART I: CONTEXT SENSITIVITY: VARIABILITY VS. STABILITY PART II: THEORIES OF CONTEXT SENSITIVITY PART III: CONTEXTS: WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW WE CREATE THEM

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Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism

Philosophical Perspectives (2005)

Herman Cappelen

Skepticism

Pluralism

10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00051.x

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Introduction

Oxford University Press eBooks (2015)

Herman Cappelen Ernie Lepore

Extract In 1995 we began a collaboration on two series of papers: one began with our 1997 paper ‘On an Alleged Connection between the Theory of Meaning and Indirect Speech’. The other series started with our 1997 paper ‘Varieties of Quotation’. The first series led ultimately to our 2005 book Insensitive Semantics and the second to our 2007 book Language Turned on Itself. This volume collects many of those joint efforts combined with some of our single-authored papers along the same lines. In this introduction we briefly locate these papers in their historical context, provide some reflections on their legacy, and say a bit about how we see the connection between the papers and the two books. The ‘Alleged Connection’ Series One series of papers began with our 1997 paper ‘On an Alleged Connection between the Theory of Meaning and Indirect Speech’. Four central concerns motivated these papers. A methodological concern: don’t conflate semantic content with speech act content—don’t aim for a systematic theory of what speakers say

Conflation

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641338.003.0001

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Conceptual Engineering without Bedrock and without Fixed Points

Oxford University Press eBooks (2018)

Herman Cappelen

This chapter considers whether there are any limits to conceptual engineering, developing the idea that there are no safe spaces from conceptual change. First, it considers Chalmers’s argument for bedrock concepts. It argues that Chalmers’s claim that there is an asymmetric structure in the space of disputes is an (implausible) empirical claim. Second, it considers Eklund’s claim to the effect that our thinnest normative concepts are irreplaceable, and this is a limit to conceptual engineering, and shows that Eklund doesn’t establish this. It ends by revisiting some old worries, defending the choice of the term ‘conceptual engineering’, and responding to the claim that by making conceptual engineering inscrutable and out of control, it has been debunked rather than defended. However, conceptual engineering is very hard for us to do, but so is (almost) everything that is important to us.

Argument (complex analysis)

Bedrock

Conceptual framework

Conceptual model

10.1093/oso/9780198814719.003.0018

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Introduction

Oxford University Press eBooks (2021)

Herman Cappelen Josh Dever

Abstract This chapter introduces the topic of the book: the philosophical foundations of AI, and in particular the powerful contemporary AI that guides our lives and receives so much attention in the media. It introduces the idea of a neural network, and poses the central puzzle of the book: when a given system’s outputs take the form of what appear to be acts of verbal communication, what is going on? When an AI system indicates, for example, that we are not creditworthy, is it saying that we are not? Can it speak? Along with posing this central question, the chapter also makes clear what the book is not about—ethics, for example—and areas in which the book might have relevance for extra-philosophical debates, such as the need for explainable AI.

Relevance

10.1093/oso/9780192894724.003.0001

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Overview

Oxford University Press eBooks (2007)

Herman Cappelen Ernie Lepore

Abstract This chapter presents the central data, (D1)-(D12), on the theory of quotation. It argues that an adequate theory of quotation should say something about how to accommodate the data surrounding (D1)-(D12). The following are discussed: D1 - opacity; D2 - quantifying in; D3 - infinitude; D4 - extant lexicon; D5 - the proximity constraint and the disquotational scheme; D6 - syntactic chameleonism; D7 - simultaneous use and mention in mixed quotation; D8 - indexicals inside mixed quotation; D9 - context sensitivity in mixed quotation; D10 - iterability in quotation; D11 - quotation without quotation marks; ad D12 - “impure” direct quotes.

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231195.003.0003

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Précis of Insensitive Semantics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2006)

Herman Cappelen Ernie Lepore

Insensitive Semantics (I) has three components: It defends a positive theory; it presents a methodology for how to distinguish semantic context sensitivity from other kinds of context sensitivity; and finally, it includes chapters critical of other contributors on these issues. In this Précis, we outline each component, but before doing so a few brief ‘big picture’ remarks about the positions defended in is are in order:

Component (thermodynamics)

Possible world

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00625.x

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Functionalism to the Rescue?

Oxford University Press eBooks (2013)

Herman Cappelen Josh Dever

This chapter first distinguishes two versions of the rescue-by-functionalism strategy: Attack (a functionalist metasemantics will provide a positive argument in favour of a revisionary indexical or de se theory of content) and Defence (a functionalist metasemantics will not provide a positive argument in favour of a revisionary theory of content, but will serve to complete the revisionary account, showing how it is defended against various objections). The chapter shows that Attack is not just incorrect, but completely and obviously hopeless. It demonstrates the inessentiality of indexicality by showing that no revisionary indexicalized theory of content is necessary. It does not follow from that position that there is no coherent indexicalized theory of content, and in particular that some such theory of content cannot be internally defended from objections. It follows only that we are not obligated to adopt such a theory, even if there is one. Nevertheless, it is also argued that Defence is unsuccessful.

Indexicality

Argument (complex analysis)

Content (measure theory)

Structural functionalism

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.003.0006

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The Instability of Incompleteness Arguments

Herman Cappelen Ernie Lepore

This chapter contains section titled: The Structure of Incompleteness Arguments Some Typical Instances of the First Stage of Incompleteness Arguments Criteria for In/completeness The Instability of Incompleteness Two Attempts to Block the Instability Argument Taylor's Reply to the Instability Argument Conclusion

Argument (complex analysis)

Completeness (order theory)

10.1002/9780470755792.ch5

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