optimize the design of physical protection systems. This effort will intend to integrate security into the design phase of a model SMR that meets current NRC physical protection requirements and provide advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D, PATHTRACE and Blender were used to model a hypothetical generic domestic SMR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. One outsider sabotage scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. The purpose of this project is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy Complex can impact the design of U.S. domestic SMRs and the complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs.
This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.
This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.
The design requirements which a Classification Society imposes for combination carriers in general are a synthesis of the individual requirements for each ship-type involved. By way of illustration, the Authors present the case of a ship which carries alternatively oil with a flash point below 60 degrees C and heavy bulk cargo, and within this category the relative structural strengths of ore/oil, OBO and PROBO ships are examined. General arrangement, electrical equipment, fire protection, ventilation of cargo tanks and pipe systems are also discussed. Finally, special strength requirements for BORO and car-transport/bulk ships are discussed. Order from BSRA as No. 48,953.
The Biosafety Level 3 Recon training is a 3D virtual tool developed for the Counter WMD Analysis Cell (CWAC) and the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) by the Application Modeling and Development Team within the NEN-3 International Threat Reduction Group. The training simulates a situation where friendly forces have secured from hostile forces a suspected bioweapons development laboratory. The trainee is a squad member tasked to investigate the facility, locate laboratories within the facility, and identify hazards to entrants and the surrounding area. Before beginning the 3D simulation, the trainee must select the appropriate MOPP level for entering the facility. The items in the simulation, including inside and outside the bioweapon facility, are items that are commonly used by scientists in Biosafety Level (BSL) laboratories. Each item has clickable red tags that, when activated, give the trainee a brief description of the item and a controllable turn-around view. The descriptions also contain information about potential hazards the item can present. Trainees must find all tagged items in order to complete the simulation, but can also reference descriptions and turn-around view of the items in a glossary menu. Training is intended to familiarize individuals whom have little or no biology or chemistry background with technical equipment used in BSL laboratories. The revised edition of this simulation (Biosafety Level 3 Virtual Lab) changes the trainee into a investigator instead of a military combatant. Many doors now require a virtual badge swipe to open. Airlock doors may come in sets such that the open door must be closed before the next door in the set can be opened. A user interface was added so that the instructor can edit the information about the items (the brief descriptions mentioned above) using the simulation software instead of the previous method of manually entering the material in xml settings files. Facility labels, such as "No Parking" and "Men's room", were changed from Korean, into English. No other changes were made.
Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model up a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. One outsider theft scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work fits into a larger Virtual Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.
By providing examples of products that have been produced in the past, it is the hopes of the authors that the audience will have a more thorough understanding of 3D modeling tools, potential applications, and capabilities that they can provide. Truly the applications and capabilities of these types of tools are only limited by one's imagination. The future of three-dimensional models lies in the expansion into the world of virtual reality where one will experience a fully immersive first-person environment. The use of headsets and hand tools will allow students and instructors to have a more thorough spatial understanding of facilities and scenarios that they will encounter in the real world.
Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. Two theft scenarios (an outsider attack and insider diversion) as well as a sabotage scenario were examined in order to optimize the security design. Security metrics are presented. This work fits into a larger Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities.
